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The Information Age empowers individuals, and affords small groups an 
opportunity to attack states’ interests with an increasing variety of tactics and 
great anonymity.  Current strategies to prevail against these emerging threats are 
inherently defensive, relying on potential adversaries to commit mistakes and 
engage in detectable behavior.  While defensive strategies are a critical 
component of a complete solution set, they cede initiative to the adversary.  
Moreover, reactive measures are not suited to quickly suppress adversary 
networks through force.  To address this shortfall in strategic planning, the 
science of networks is rapidly making clear that natural systems built over time 
with preferential attachment form scale-free networks.  These networks are 
naturally resilient to failure and random attack, but carry inherent vulnerabilities 
in their highly connected hubs.  Taking the offensive against networks is 
therefore an exercise in discovering and attacking such hubs.  To find these hub 
vulnerabilities in network adversaries, this thesis proposes a strategy called 
Stimulus Based Discovery, which leads to rapid network mapping and then 
systematically improves the accuracy and validity of this map while 
simultaneously degrading an adversary’s network cohesion.  Additionally, this 
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The terror attacks on September 11th, 2001 announced the arrival of non-
state actors as significant players in international security. No longer were 
terrorists a nuisance or criminal organization operating against the peripheral 
interests of states.  The collapse of the World Trade Center, a smoking hole in the 
Pentagon and a narrowly averted conflagration at the U.S. Capitol struck at the 
most prestigious symbols of American wealth, power, and democracy. 
Shortly thereafter, in his address the joint session of Congress, President 
Bush conceded that the war on America, declared years earlier by al Queda, 
would now be joined with the full might of American military strength.  
However, making war against networks is significantly different than attacking 
the state-centric threats the U.S. military fought in the 20th century.  Network 
threats are not bounded by the geographical constraints of national borders.  
They are not organized along the clear hierarchical channels familiar to military 
planners.  They are seldom motivated by the same factors as uniformed 
militaries acting in the service of their respective states.  And worse, the order of 
battle for these elusive networks is hidden from view.  There are few tanks to 
count, barracks and command centers to reconnoiter or industrial facilities to 
target.  Replacing these tried and true metrics of an adversary’s strength are 
elusive notions of sleeper cells, transnational identity, religious fanaticism, and a 
host of other social and organization constructs that the American military has 
few tools to counter. 
To date most attempts to defeat emerging network threats have focused 
on improving surveillance, increasing database access and structuring existing 
information to bring possible threats to the fore.  These are all worthwhile 
endeavors, but suffer from a common drawback.  Each of these methods relies on 
 xx
the adversary network to do something observable.  Better surveillance can only 
detect an action if the adversary chooses to act.  Better databases can only search 
those things that were observed, and information structuring is only useful if 
there are buried observations that would benefit from closer examination.  
Therefore, techniques in vogue for finding and stopping network organizations 
are primarily defensive because they rely on an untenable hope that the 
adversary will make some error along the path to attack and that this error will 
be detected.  However, the authors are not satisfied with this defensive, reactive 
approach to fighting networks.   
The first step in creating an offensive strategy for attacking networks is to 
understand two critical factors that will define the environment for Information 
Age conflict.  First, the range of possible threats faced by U.S. forces is 
dramatically larger than the threat spectrum encountered during the Industrial 
Age.  This significant growth in complexity is brought on by the empowerment 
of individuals and small groups to endanger states in ways that have not existed 
before.  Thus, the range of threats states must account for is no longer limited to 
the capability of a deranged tyrant.  Rather, states are now susceptible to attack 
by small groups that accrue resources and power independent of national 
support or loyalties.  Second, advances in information and weaponry allow the 
U.S. military to break the historical link between range and accuracy.  Sailors, 
Marines, Soldiers and Airmen must no longer get close to get accurate.  With 
precision-guided weapons it is now possible to operate targeting and 
engagement system in separate locations within unique processes, which in turn 
enables the parallel engagement of hundreds of enemy aimpoints from extreme 
range.  However, the application of this force is rendered useless against 
networks without a capability to rapidly identify valid targets in the adversary’s 
system. 
 xxi
The challenge of attacking networks is only made more difficult by the 
incongruence of the existing strategic framework and the Joint Campaign 
Planning Process to the reality of how networks are organized.  In a well-
intentioned effort to expose more military officers to classical works on strategy 
and operational art the professional education curriculum has reduced warfare 
to a cookie cutter formula centered on industrial threats.  This gross 
simplification for explaining one of mankind’s most sophisticated activities does 
not bode well for inculcating America’s warriors with a new mindset to fight 
networks.  Furthermore, the planning processes that exist are not aligned to 
leverage America’s strengths against new adversaries that do not conform to 
traditional organizations and value systems.   
To compensate for this staid approach this thesis looks to new discoveries 
in network science that demonstrate all human organizations grown over time 
with preferential attachment will organize themselves into scale-free networks.  
Like all networks scale-free systems are composed of nodes and links.  However, 
in the scale-free network some nodes, called hubs, acquire an extraordinary 
number of links while most nodes remain loosely connected.  This hub and 
spokes topology makes scale-free systems extremely robust to random failure, 
but vulnerable to focused attack against the hubs that hold the system together.  
America’s independent targeting and engagement systems are ideally suited to 
attack the hubs in such a network, but finding hubs presents a daunting 
challenge when an adversary is actively trying to remain covert.   
To address this challenge of finding hubs in elusive networks, the authors 
propose a strategy called “Stimulus Based Discovery.”  Stimulus enhances the 
capability to detect nodes and hubs by focusing collection in time and space to 
several likely network stimulus responses.  In short, Stimulus Based Discovery 
converts American firepower superiority into an information advantage and  
decreases the time between threat perception and ordnance delivery against an 
 xxii
adversary’s network hubs.  Thus, American forces retain the initiative and put 
networks on the defense. 
A series of case studies is presented to support Stimulus Based Discovery 
and define four different tactics for stimulating networks.  Any network is 
composed of nodes and links, and both of these can be can be stimulated in two 
different ways.  First, networks can be stimulated by explicitly changing the 
network with actions such as killing or capturing a node.  Second, the network 
can be stimulated by cognitively distorting the way nodes and links are 
perceived by humans in the system.  Thus, there are four possible stimuli:  
explicit nodal stimulus, explicit link stimulus, cognitive nodal distortion, and 
cognitive link distortion.  A case study for each tactic discusses how that how 
particular type of stimulus has successfully revealed nodes in a hidden network, 
and buttresses the argument that Stimulus Based Discovery is a sound strategy 
applicable for attack against any network 
Finally, the authors realize that theory must be rigorously evaluated prior 
to implementation.  To this end a model was developed to serve as a laboratory 
for experimenting with the effects of stimulus against a reactive network 
organization.  The simulation is built around a multi-agent system in which each 
node represents an individual actor in the adversary network. Although the 
threats susceptible to Stimulus Based Discovery vary across the entire threat 
spectrum (due to the underlying human social organization), the model is based 
on a terrorist organization.  The terrorists are modeled as a social organization 
that seeks to conduct attacks coordinated through functional relationships.  The 
model includes recruiting, training, resource gathering, leadership, influence, 
personality and many other social behaviors that add fidelity to the Stimulus 
Based Discovery laboratory.  The result of this low level decision-making is 
macro behavior that closely matches theoretical predictions.  Thus, the laboratory 
 xxiii
provides a realistic capability to further explore Stimulus Based Discovery with 
both qualitative and quantitative results. 
In conclusion, the authors believe the United States’ current war with al 
Queda is a prelude to conflict with many other types of networks.  Stimulus 
Based Discovery is therefore an effort to address this new form of organization 
by integrating the battle proven concepts of attack and offensive with the 
inherent vulnerabilities of a network topology.  Historical examination and 
emerging science suggest that Stimulus Based Discovery can be a powerful tool 
for converting America’s firepower superiority into an information advantage 
over network organizations that defy traditional tools for applying combat 
power.  The laboratory created for this thesis is a first step to exploring the 




























I. THE NEW COMPETITIVE LANDSCAPE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
John Arquilla, a widely published author on the Information Age jokes, 
“Two thirds of the earth’s surface is covered in water.  The other third is covered 
by papers on Information Warfare.”  Therefore, yet another thesis on this topic 
could easily repeat and regurgitate familiar rhetoric that changes are coming and 
offer another hypothetical of what future conflict might require.  However, that 
is exactly what this thesis is not!  LT Michael and I specifically ask a hard 
question, “Is there emerging science based on hard mathematics that leads to 
new concepts for winning wars in the Information Age?”  The answer we have 
found is emphatically, yes. 
In March of 2000, I attended the Navy’s Global Wargame exploring the 
conceptual requirements and operational procedures for conducting effects-
based operations.  As a longtime student of military history I was immediately 
skeptical.  Military operations have always been about achieving some effect.  
The Ancient Greek desire to capture Troy fits the effects-based model if you 
phrase it, “Leaders of Troy will desire to surrender the city.”  During the game a 
naval aviator and flag officer summarized what I was thinking quite succinctly.  
He said,  “I have always found that a 2000 pound bomb has one hell of an effect 
if you hit the guy your aiming at.  I don’t know why we are trying to make it so 
damn complicated.”  So the strategy proposed here for taking the offensive 
against networks is not about replacing lethal force with a new-age definition of 
how to fight peacefully.  Rather, redefining attack is about taking the offensive 
against networks and developing a strategy to find valid targets in elusive 
organizations.   
Implementing the strategy proposed here for attacking networks requires 
another iteration in the advance of military art.  Victors across the ages have 
2 
continually integrated new technology with organization and doctrine to 
produce operating concepts that overpower, outmaneuver and otherwise 
outperform their adversaries. (Cohen, 1996)  Therefore, the strategy proposed 
here recommends yet another blend of technology, organization and operating 
concept to produce decisive results against a new form of adversary.   
Bearing in mind the technology, organization and concept trifecta, this 
thesis focuses on concept.  Virtually all Information Age power relies in some 
measure upon advances in technology, however there is already a healthy debate 
on the technologies for future conflict.  Therefore, specific technologies, 
weaponry and information processing tools are not addressed.  This thesis is 
narrowly focused on two elements of future conflict most obvious now in the 
pioneering days of the Information Age: the empowerment of individuals and 
the independence of range and accuracy.  From these characteristics, we examine 
specific scientific ideas that create advantage in this competitive landscape and 
propose a strategy for attacking network organizations that seeks to militarily 
suppress this emerging form of organization.  Then with the theory established 
and explained this thesis concludes with a model, which provides a laboratory 
for testing the proposed network attack strategy. 
B. STATE CONTROL OVER THE MEANS OF WAR 
The Information Age changes the competitive environment.  However, 
this broad assertion does not lend itself to quantitative comparison.  Therefore, a 
working definition of the specific attributes of competition affected by the 
information age is necessary for rigorous analysis.  The challenge at this stage is 
daunting.  There is by no means a definitive or comprehensive definition of the 
Information Age, and this thesis is much too short for such a postulation.  
Furthermore, the ubiquitous availability of information has only begun in the last 
decade and any attempt to define the Information Age at its inception is merely 
conjecture about the possible.  However, one characteristic seems self-evident 
3 
about the world today – empowerment of individuals raises the unpredictable 
nature of a single human being to the level of strategic influence.   
Consider this significant change in light of the past 350 years of western 
civilization.  In 1618 war broke out in Europe when Bohemian Protestants 
declared independence from the Holy Roman Empire and the ruling Hapsburgs 
converged on Prague to re-subjugate the heretics and insurgents.  Individual 
princes throughout Germany took sides to advance their political or religious 
goals.  France and Spain entered the conflict to fight for dynastic control, and 
Sweden fought for religion and territory.  The war spread and expanded as weak 
alliances formed and dissolved in hasty defenses of shifting priorities.  The 
conflict eventually touched every major power in Europe and was fought only to 
a bitter concession in 1648.  The Thirty Years War, as it has come to be known, 
was fought primarily by mercenary armies for a tangled imbroglio of princely 
ambitions, religious zealotry and dynastic control.  In fact when delegates finally 
began to meet in 1644 to arrange a peace settlement “after nearly a year of 
meetings the delegates were still not agreed on the all-important subjecta 
belligerantia:  who was at war with whom over what?” (Blitzer, 1967, p. 42)  The 
overwhelming complexity of the situation arose from an indeterminate morass of 
conflicting authority.   
When the Thirty Years War began there was no precedent for who had 
authority to declare war on whom.  There was no international law or accepted 
norms that identified who was just in their use of violence to pursue political or 
religious aims.  And most of all, there was no consensus on who was a legitimate 
actor in the conduct of international relations.  Princes fought for territory, power 
or to proselytize their religious views.  Religion sanctioned the bloody slaughter 
of opposing devotees, and dynasties raised armies to extend their influence or 
weaken their adversaries.  Three decades of conflict produced no clear victor and 
therefore no resolution to the considerable ambiguities of authority.  So in the 
4 
aftermath of war delegates to the two separate peace processes knew they must 
take steps to address questions of authority in religion, politics and government.  
When the final Peace of Westphalia was signed in 1648, its lasting contribution to 
world security was a strong endorsement for nations states, not individuals, to 
function as actors in international diplomacy. (Treaty of Westphalia)  
Although the compromise reached at Westphalia addressed various 
political issues of the war, dire consequences in human suffering had a more 
profound effect.  Moderate estimates suggest that the Thirty Years War resulted 
in one third of the Germanic people dying a violent death or more frequently 
falling to the excruciating plight of starvation.1 (Parker, 1984)  Losses to the other 
parties to conflict did not equal one in three dead, but were significant and tragic.  
With the life and livelihood of the common man so easily snuffed by individual 
actions of the privileged it is no small wonder that the brilliant political thinker 
Thomas Hobbes wrote in 1651. 
During the time men live without a common power to keep them 
all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a 
war, as is of every man, against every man…Whatsoever therefore 
is consequent to a time of war…the same is consequent to the time, 
wherein men live without other security, than what their own 
strength, and their own invention shall furnish them… In such 
condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is 
uncertain:  and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, 
nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no 
commodious building; no instruments of moving, and removing 
such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the 
earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which 
is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the 
life of man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short. (Hobbes, 1960) 
Hobbes idea to solve this intractable problem lay in the idea of absolutism – the 
concentration of power in one supreme authority.  The only way to subdue these 
divisive forces was to impose on them a superior force, a new and rational 
                                                 
1 Exact death tolls for the Thirty Years Wars vary from 15 to 20 percent all the way to 70 
percent in some areas. 
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political order.  This awesome power, which Hobbes dubbed Leviathan, was 
needed precisely because the forces of local and class privilege, tradition, and 
religious schism were themselves so strong.   
The idea of absolutism, although not specifically coined as a term of 
reference until much later, slowly began to take root in Europe and centralize 
power into the state and away from individuals.  The most apparent 
manifestation of absolute dominion in the 17th century is Louis the XIV of France.  
When Louis’ religious advisor and powerful prime minister, Cardinal Mazarin 
died in 1661 Louis assumed the full mantel of power and established absolute 
secular rule of France.  His subsequent installation of bureaucracy instead of 
aristocracy to run the workings of government brought the entire resources of 
France under his dominion. 
Across the English Channel, absolutism was slower to take hold due to 
internal strife, but in 1688 the Glorious Revolution installed a constitutional form 
of government that centralized control with the state.  The English Parliament 
passed the Declaration of Rights, putting forth the terms England was to be ruled 
by.  When William and Mary accepted these terms they were crowned King and 
Queen of England.  Then in the years immediately afterward the mettle of the 
English system was put to the test in a series of conflicts to check the ambitions of 
Louis XIV.  
War for the succession of the Spanish crown in 1701 tested the newly 
organized states in a contest that pitted France, Spain and Portugal against a 
Grand Alliance of virtually every other country in Europe.  In this conflict, the 
scope and magnitude of a successful field army required a sophisticated 
governmental organization that could harness the industry and more 
importantly the finances of the state at large.  In fact, the English constitutional 
system proved more effective than even Louis’ authoritarian bureaucracy.  
“William III [of England] could draw upon the resources of his country more 
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effectively than any other sovereign of his time.  Parliament voted him funds not 
only by raising taxes, but also by borrowing money from the newly established 
Bank of England.  William thus got more money, and got it faster, than he could 
ever have raised through taxation alone.” (Blitzer, p. 167)  In the end, the mass 
mobilization of Europe resulted in the defeat of France and the treaty of Utrecht 
in 1713. (Wolf, 1970) 
The 17th century and the wars that defined it, mark a turning point in 
history because the shift toward secular government reduced the states 
accountability to religion.  By 1748 the Pope would formally relinquish authority 
in civil matters declaring: 
For Forms of Government let fools contest; Whate’er is best 
administer’d is best. (Essay on Man, pp. 303-4) 
Furthermore, the consolidation of power with absolutism diminished the effect 
of capricious princely ambitions on the general welfare of man.  However, the 
problem of a bad king remained a burden and the vice of Leviathan.  John Locke 
wrote in Two Treatises of Civil Government  
…it is evident that absolute monarchy, which by some men is 
counted for the only government in the world, is indeed 
inconsistent with civil society, and so can be no form of civil 
government at all.  The first and fundamental positive law of all 
commonwealths is the establishing of the legislative power. 
(Second Treatis, p. 90) 
The net result of these tectonic shifts in the way power was gathered and 
administered is that individual actors were left off the stage of international 
relations.  When the treaty of Westphalia was signed in 1648 it began the 
transition from dynastic to bureaucratic states in the international system. 
(Treaty of Westphalia)  This first step followed by the emergence of absolutism 
and a military requirement to harness the entire state resources to wage war 
meant that strategic threats were immaterial if not connected with the authority 
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of the state.  By the end of the 18th century power to act in the international 
system resided with state actors and not individuals. 
Our world has been defined by this state-centric model ever since.  As 
recently at 1945 and the establishment of the United Nations the concept of state 
sovereignty is highlighted key to preventing conflict and the inevitable human 
suffering it entails.  The United Nations Charter affirms the notion of state 
sovereignty as a method to regulate interstate diplomacy and reduce the 
possibility of war.  In addition, numerous other conventions on international law 
completed within the United Nations continue to reinforce the ideal of 
sovereignty. 
Strategic threats in this state centric environment have materialized almost 
exclusively when ambitious rulers took control of states and turned their nations’ 
capability against their own citizens or outside their borders.  Quick 
recapitulation of the last century’s most notorious individuals bears this out.  
Hitler, Stalin, and to a lesser extent Hussein, Pinochet, Idi Amin, Pol Pot, Qadafi 
and others presented a threat to their fellow citizens and in some cases the world 
only after they ascended to the helm of power in their respective state.   
Furthermore, success in interstate conflict during this period has been 
directly linked to a nation’s capacity for industrial production because the 
machines and armaments of war were absolutely essential to a successful 
campaign.  Carl Von Clausewitz wrote of early 19th century conflict that 
“Because war is an act of force, committed against a living, reacting opponent, it 
produces three interactions that, in theory, lead to three extremes:  maximum use 
of force; total disarmament of the enemy; and maximum exertion of strength.“ 
(Clausewitz, p. 78)  Similarly, Russell Weigley’s seminal work The American Way 
of War, argues the U.S. military perspective on conflict has always gravitated 
toward destructive war.  “An army strong enough to choose the strategy of 
annihilation should always choose it, because the most certain and probably the 
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most rapid route to victory lay through the destruction of the enemy’s armed 
forces.” (Russell, 1997)  Fighting in this total, destructive fashion in the industrial 
age required the complete devotion of state resources to manufacturing the tools 
of war.  Anything less failed to achieve the proven strategy of destruction and 
mayhem required for victory.  Therefore, in the Industrial Age an individual that 
did not control the state’s means of production could not create the 
manufactured goods required to pose a strategic threat. 
In summary, the last three centuries have slowly eroded the capability of 
one person or a collection of people to create and sustain strategic threats 
without first taking control of a state.  From the beginning of the 18th century an 
individuals’ lack of access to the resources and manpower of the state made it 
nearly impossible for a sole individual to threaten an entire nation.  Admittedly 
strategic threats have emerged in this period from dictators and tyrants, but only 
after those men successful captured the reins of state power.  Therefore, the 
requirement to seize control of a state in order to pose a strategic threat created 
large barriers to individuals with malicious sentiment against a particular state.  
Sadly, those days are probably gone because systemic changes inherent to an 
Information Age empower individuals to compete with states.  This rise of 
power among individuals and small groups undoubtedly forms one of the 
structural elements of future conflict. 
C. EMPOWERMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
An information-enabled world gives power to individuals.  John Arquilla 
and David Ronfeldt note “The rise of networks means that power is migrating to 
nonstate actors”. (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001)  In The Lexus and the Olive Tree, 
Thomas Friedman makes a similar statement that “states don’t represent the real 
power structure anymore.  The relevant power structure is global.  It is in the 
hands of the Superpowers and the Supermarkets.”  Friedman goes on to 
explicitly state that any entrepreneurial individual can become a dynamic player 
in world markets. (Friedman, 2000)  The source of this change is a growing 
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interconnectedness among people all over the globe, often called “globalization.”  
However, the very networks that make the international fluidity of capital, goods 
and services available to a global economy the conduits of finance, supply and 
organization for criminal and terrorist networks to move onto the international 
stage.    
Information Age opponents can accrue resources and international 
political power independent of states.  Then these transnational organizations 
can use that power to create a significant threat against a state.  Osama bin Laden 
is the archetype for this “Super Empowered Angry Man” (Friedman) that 
threatens the international system by coordinating a transnational organization 
through information age tools such as global transportation and the Internet.  
Nongovernmental organizations can take many benevolent forms including 
international environmental protection activists, relief organizations and political 
campaigns such as the International Campaign to Ban Landmines.  However, the 
same liquidity of capital, ease of transportation and smooth flow of international 
service that create a foundation for benevolent work can also be turned to 
nefarious purposes.   
Globalization and interdependence have not only encouraged the 
emergence of ‘upright global citizens’ but have facilitated the rise of 
transnational criminal organization which pose new challenges to 
both national and international security. (Williams, 1999)   
Even more troublesome, growing reliance on information tools and a 
generally poor understanding of information security open a state’s computer 
infrastructure to the threat of small hacker groups or individuals.  “The hacking 
threat is constantly evolving, elusive, and becoming more dangerous” (McClure, 
2001)  However, the number of people required to conduct even the most 
sophisticated attacks remains small. Hacking is a contest of intellect and social 
engineering whose only barrier cost to entry is practice, a bright mind and a 
devious purpose.  James Adams describes a plausible trajectory for hacking as a 
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devastating new form of warfare in his book, The Next World War. (Adams, 1998)  
If Adams and others prove remotely accurate then it will is not be outside the 
bounds of reality to consider catastrophes such as GPS attacks that cause 
commercial airplane crashes, control system hacks in nuclear reactor plants, mass 
flooding caused by dam gate hacks, economic chaos caused by erasing the New 
York Stock Exchange, or hackers selling technical drawings for modern nuclear 
weapons stolen from U.S. computers.  This short list of possible attacks is merely 
representative of an infinite set of actions ranging across the threat spectrum of 
direct violence, economic warfare, agricultural deprivation, and weapons of 
mass destruction.  The distinguishing characteristic of these attacks and any 
other is that the limits of disruption are only bounded by the limits of 
imagination and technical acumen.  
The idea of a small group of hackers wreaking mayhem and perhaps 
destruction upon a nation is a significant departure from the reality of the state 
dominated security environment.  An empowered individual is not subject to the 
restraints inherent in a state based international system.  Even a dictator must 
hold together a coalition of supporters, and is bound by the requirement to 
protect their interests.  Despots and tyrants have often committed atrocities, but 
in doing so they knowingly risk their position, power and wealth if they 
destabilize their support base.  Even Saddam Hussein, the late 20th century’s icon 
of supreme dictator, holds together his Tikrit based tribal coalition with 
preferential policy and lavish schemes to pump resources into his support base. 
(Ritter)  The information age villain is released from the constraints of coalition 
maintenance because he can act in isolation or very small groups of likeminded 
radicals.  This opens the floodgate of possible options and creates an 
environment where planning cannot be based on a rational actor model.  
Replacing this model is a frightening notion that we will face threats from the 
wildest reaches of the criminally insane mind.  Thus, an important characteristic 
of information age conflict is that individuals and small groups can pose strategic 
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threats to states, and the range of options available to these small groups is 
dramatically larger than the threat set encountered in the Industrial Age. 
D. THE INDEPENDENCE OF RANGE AND ACCURACY 
The threat set facing nation-states is more complicated than it has been 
over the last few centuries, but the United States also enjoys a significant new 
capability brought on by the Information Age.  There is now an independence of 
range and accuracy that has never existed before.  This independence liberates 
the delivery of ordnance from the difficult task of aiming the weapon.  In turn 
ordnance delivery and targeting have developed into highly specialized skills 
that can occur in different locations synchronized by advanced communications.  
The sum effect of this evolution is precision engagement from extreme range and 
without warning.  The challenge is finding an operational concept that leverages 
the power of independent targeting and engagement into a capability for 
thwarting the attacks of empowered individuals. 
For centuries, getting accurate has always meant getting close.  For 
example, if you wanted to kill a specific individual in the Stone Age you would 
have to get close enough to touch him or throw a rock.  Then the advent of aimed 
weapons such as the Mongol horn bow introduced a capability to accurately 
engage beyond the reach of hand held weapons.  Muskets and then rifled guns 
increased the distance between combatants even more.  However, in each of 
these advances the ultimate distance was still limited to the visual range of the 
soldier or sailor that would carry out the lethal action.  Then in the twentieth 
century there was a fundamental shift in the way targets were acquired and 
engaged that separated the person choosing and aiming the weapons from the 
soldier or sailor that would fire the ordnance.   
This separation between targeteer and shooter began in 1905 with the first 
use of indirect fire by the Japanese army during the siege of Port Arthur.  In the 
Russo-Japanese war the Japanese Navy chose not to attack the Russian position 
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in Port Arthur.  Therefore, the Japanese Army was forced to conduct a rearguard 
action against the port stronghold before advancing north against the main 
Russian force.  To accomplish the siege of Port Arthur the Japanese army officers 
introduced an artillery innovation.  They inclined their guns to fire over the top 
of the mountains adjacent to the port and the shot fell on the reverse slope 
defenses.  The tactic weakened the Russian defenders with little risk of return 
fire, and the Japanese Army successfully captured the port.  Previous to this 
attack, field artillery and naval guns had always been used in a direct fire mode 
where the gun commander had visual contact with his target.  Indirect artillery 
fire was the birth of separating the targeteer with binoculars from the shooter 
that would fire the ordnance. 
Thirty-five years after the battle for Port Arthur the growing separation 
between targeting and engagement can be glimpsed again in World War II.  The 
Italian air power theorist Giulio Douhet observed the bloodshed of World War I 
and considered airpower the weapon to avoid stalemated conflict. (Douhet, p. 
57)  Douhet foresaw the future of the bomber’s ability to deliver firepower 
against targets deep in the interior of a nation and he predicted that civil society 
would demand their nation to surrender in the face of sure destruction. (Douhet, 
p. 58)  World War II witnessed Douhet’s theory put to the test with the 
unrestricted allied bombing of Japan and Germany.  Regardless of Douhet’s 
accuracy about the effects of airpower, the processes surrounding the 
employment of these bombers further separated targeting from the operator that 
flew the bombers.     
Advanced bombsights made air power possible and required specialists to 
operate.  Development of an effective bombsight made it possible, or at least 
probable, to hit a target on the surface of the earth from high altitude.  Thus, 
large fleets of bombers envisioned by Douhet became a popular tactic for 
engaging valuable industrial and civilian targets.  
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Specially trained photo interpreters were the next critical step toward 
specialization of targeting and delivery.  Contrary to general opinion, it is very 
difficult to determine what a reconnaissance photograph shows without a 
trained photo analyst.  “The intelligence on an image may not be self-evident; it 
may require interpretation by trained photo interpreters who can ‘see’ things on 
the image that the untrained person cannot.” (Lowenthal, 2000)  To the untrained 
eye, trucks can be easily mistaken for infantry vehicles and cattle paths 
misidentified as roads.  Simple environmental factors like long shadows and 
snow can completely disguise an enemy army that would leap out of the picture 
to a trained analyst.  Intensive training is required to see these details, and the 
specialists that emerged in World War II were the first of this new breed of 
specialists that worked well removed from the bombers that flew the missions.  
Contrary to the sea captain that used optics to sail his ships into a better firing 
position, neither the bombardier nor the photo interpreter knows how to fly the 
bomber.  They were specialists at converting their observations into targets but 
not at operating a fighting platform.  This specialization marks a turning point 
when optics and targeting changed from a skill that every military officer was 
expected to conduct into a role for experts with unique skills.   
The Cold War accelerated this trend of increasing specialization.  When 
World War II ended image analysis became the primary tool for peering behind 
the iron curtain and trying to determine the trajectory of Soviet intentions.  In the 
early days, the United States employed an aggressive strategy of high altitude 
over flights of the Soviet Union with sophisticated cameras.  Later when the 
Soviet Union launched Sputnik in 1957 it opened a whole new domain for the 
development of optics.  “The U.S. collection array was largely built to respond to 
the difficulties of penetrating the Soviet target – a closed society with a vast land 
mass, frequent bad weather, and a long-standing tradition of secrecy and 
deception.” (Lowenthal, p. 20)  Space was the new frontier and America’s 
cameras were quick to man the outposts of this netherworld.  Satellites provided 
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a platform that could not be shot down like Gary Powers’ U2, and provided a 
guaranteed opportunity to look at the Russians at least once a day, every day.  
The strategic community instantly monopolized this capability.  Spaced-based 
optics augmented by aerial reconnaissance provided a flood of raw imagery that 
required interpretation. 
Analysts by the hundreds were sequestered at Strategic Air Command 
(SAC), the long secret National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the even less 
well-known Office of Photographic Interpretation (OPI) to interpret this deluge 
of raw imagery.  These analysts developed hundreds of targets for nuclear 
weapons and gave our leaders strategic insight into Soviet activity.  However, 
the knowledge created by this multitude of specialists was cordoned into special 
plans for nuclear war that remained secret from the conventional military. 
(McKenzie, 2000)  The Cold War need for draconian security was real, but 
concentrating targeting specialists in strategic missions isolated their highly 
capable skills.   
It is the introduction of cruise missiles finally brought modern targeting 
expertise to general tactical forces.  The American military first invested in cruise 
missile research based on the German V-1 design immediately following World 
War II, but the early effectiveness of ballistic missiles overshadowed nascent 
cruise programs because ballistic missiles were better suited to strategic nuclear 
deterrence.  Thus, cruise missile research faded from vogue until Egyptian forces 
attacked and sank the Israeli destroyer Elath in 1967 with a modified Soviet Styx 
missile. (United States Tomahawk Cruise Missile Program)  The U.S. Navy 
rekindled early interest in cruise missiles and deployed the Harpoon missile in 
its initial operational capability ten years later in 1977. (Harpoon Fact Sheet)  This 
weapon system can be targeted from organic information collected from the 
launch ship, but the preferred method requires offboard sensors to target.  Then 
in 1983 the Tomahawk Cruise Missile entered initial operational capability with 
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the fleet, providing the first conventional naval ordnance that relied exclusively 
on offboard targeting support.  These cruise missiles were co-developed with the 
Air Force to provide a common sea launched and ground launched intermediate 
nuclear option in 1984 with conventional land attack missiles coming online in 
1986. (United States Tomahawk Cruise Missile Program)  The operational 
concept for conventional Tomahawks was envisioned to be limited strikes 
against high value strategic targets.  Strategic targeting centers would provide 
ships their missions to load into the missiles with very limited information 
available to the shipboard personnel about the targets for their missiles.  Due to 
the overwhelming success of Tomahawk missiles in the 1991 Gulf War demand 
grew for a Tomahawk missile that was more responsive to operational 
commanders and could be targeted on local information. 
Requirements for lower operational control of Tomahawk cruise missiles 
and a concomitant desire to decrease the response time of manned aircraft strikes 
an American vision emerged for an interconnected battlefield.  This concept, 
coined a “System of Systems” by then Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Admiral Bill Owens. (Owens, 2001)  Since the “System of Systems” was first 
proposed it has moved through many different conceptual refinements, but the 
core vision remains the same – a desire to process and structure information that 
allows targeting to function independently of engagement.  Thus targets are 
planned with great accuracy independent of the attack platform that will deliver 
ordnance. 
Over the last twelve years the technology and organization necessary to 
bring this vision to life has evolved.  Mass production of precision-guided 
munitions, further refinement of the Tomahawk missile and a host of new image 
collection capabilities provide a technological foundation for the complete 
separation of targeting and engagement.  New targeting processes and a 
willingness to allow lower level discretion for the delivery of precision ordnance 
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has resulted in much faster response times to targeting information.  It is now 
possible to attack specific objects with great precision from extreme range.  
Insight gained from data analyzed far from the battlefield can now have direct 
effect on the tactical situation.  Thus, the second definitive characteristic of 
conflict in the information age is an American capability to engage almost any 
target, anytime.   
The remainder of this a thesis examines how America can leverage the 
power of independent targeting and engagement to control the dramatically 
broader threat set posed by empowered individuals.  Recall that individuals or 
small groups may not emerge as threats until their attacks are already in 
progress.  At that critical moment, the application of independently targeted 
firepower may blunt the obvious attack.  However, a process to emasculate the 
organization behind an attack is not proven.  In order to apply firepower 
advantages, targets must be found.  Similar to the United States’ battle with Al 
Queda, the challenge is learning whom the adversary is and where they are 
located.  Since adversaries in the information age will not likely mass on the 
battlefield in a 20th century formation, new strategies are required to attack 
networks that blend into the fabric of 21st century civilization. 
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II. WHAT TO ATTACK AND WHEN 
If the systemic characteristics of Information Age conflict are a 
dramatically larger threat spectrum brought on by the empowerment of 
individuals, versus an American capability to engage with complete 
independence between range and accuracy then the central question follows. 
How can a capability to independently target and engage militarily suppress the 
networks of empowered, diabolical individuals? 
A. HOW WE’VE ALWAYS DONE IT 
Every nation would form a unique answer to any question about the 
proper application of coercive force because the way a country fights is 
inextricably linked with national identity and a particular conceptualization of 
war.  American answers to questions about warfare draw upon our heritage, 
culture and perspective.  However, our perspective and the intellectual choices 
we have made about the nature of war define the lexicon and organization for 
the answer.  Therefore, an examination of the American military perspective on 
conflict is the right place to critique the way we’ve always done it. 
The United States’ capability to focus coercive power has evolved from 
the American perspective on war.  Our political leaders and high-ranking 
warriors advocate specific intellectual choices about the nature of conflict.  In 
turn, these choices create an American perspective on war and provide a 
common reference for decision-making in security issues.  This chapter 
challenges the continued applicability of these choices at the core of American 
war making, and suggests that fundamental reform is necessary for victory in a 
system defined by empowered individuals and the independence of range and 
accuracy. 
In 1986 Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act and began the democratization of security studies for the 
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U.S. Armed Forces.  The new law mandated that officers receive Joint 
Professional Military Education (JPME) to be eligible for flag or general rank. 
(Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986)  Prior to 
the Goldwater Nichols Act, formal education in security studies was available 
exclusively at service war colleges, national defense universities and security 
studies programs at a few civilian universities.  However, this resident student 
model was insufficient to meet the Goldwater-Nichols requirement that all 
officers receive graduate level security education.  Implementing Goldwater-
Nichols required exporting military academics to a highly dispersed student 
audience that already “did more before nine in the morning than most people do 
all day.”2  To compensate, all of the service war colleges rolled out non-resident 
programs and distance education to teach the basics of strategy, policy, national 
security decision-making and joint operations.  Students in the JPME program 
are exposed to the classics of strategic thinking and are encouraged to reach their 
own conclusions.  However, there is an undeniable “check the block” mentality 
that pervades much of the curriculum material and has led inevitably to a 
simplified pedagogical approach to teaching warfare in just three courses.   
To condense the study of war down to a three-course endeavor, curricular 
choices have been made that are consistent in their approach and versatile in 
application but oversimplify one of humanity’s most complex activities.  JPME 
begins with classic works by Clausewitz and Sun Tzu complemented by healthy 
injections of American politico-military history.  A course in resource allocation 
and decision-making is added to this foundation and then the program ends 
with operational lessons from joint warfighting in the 20th century.  The explicit 
framework across each of these courses is a three level model of warfare.  At the 
top of this model strategy blends ends, ways and means into coherent plans for 
exerting coercive force.  Subordinate to strategy is operational art that addresses 
the interaction of space, force and time to produce combat that leads to strategic 
                                                 
2 U.S. Army recruiting slogan from mid 1980’s. 
19 
objectives.  Such battles are then won by superior tactics, which govern the 
interaction of forces engaged with an adversary.  This logical and versatile 
framework produces a rote, almost obvious, answer to the question, “What wins 
wars?”  Effective tactics win engagements.  Engagements woven with 
operational art win campaigns.  Campaigning with a good strategy wins wars.  
However, Oscar Wilde remarked, “The pure and simple truth is rarely pure and 
never simple.” (Winokur, 2002)  Unfortunately, the truth about winning wars is 
also impure and complex leaving much to be desired from the schoolbook 
answer linking tactics, operational art and strategy.   
Suspend disbelief momentarily and examine the possibility that there is 
no predictable connection between strategy, operations and tactics.  Success at 
one level of conflict may have no impact or even negative consequences on the 
level above or below it.  For example, overwhelming tactical victory is no 
guarantor of strategic success.  The United States never lost a battle in Vietnam 
and inflicted casualties on the adversary in a 50:1 ratio, yet America lost the 
Vietnam War.  Israel and Great Britain seldom prevent tactical actions by the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization or the Irish Republican Army, yet there is no 
independent state of Palestine or Northern Ireland that heralds strategic success 
as a result of numerous successful tactical operations.  The doctrinal answer for 
cases that do not fit the logical progression from successful tactics to fulfilled 
strategy is that the strategy must be wrong.  However, equally false is the 
assumption that proper strategy is a guarantor of success.  For example, the 
world may never know the strategy of the Taliban in Afghanistan, but America’s 
apparent victory in 2002 is not irrefutable evidence that U.S. strategy was better.  
Only time will tell whether America’s decision to pursue a global conflict with 
terrorists and an invasion if Iraq with strained international support will prove to 
be a good strategy. 
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The three level conflict model also fails to account for the disproportionate 
result of actions that do not fit neatly into strategy, operations or tactics.  For 
example, insignificant or ineffective actions at the tactical level of conflict can 
have far reaching strategic impacts.  In 1968, a single company of American 
soldiers under the misguided leadership of Lt William Calley killed 
approximately 300 civilians in the Vietnamese village of My Lai.  Calley’s actions 
were unquestionably reprehensible, and had no impact whatsoever on the 
tactical military parity between the United States, North Vietnam and the Viet 
Cong.  However, when the details of this action exploded in the U.S. press 
Calley’s bad decision-making and murderous tactics had a significant strategic 
impact on the war. (Public Broadcasting Service)  Although Calley’s crimes may 
be an extreme example they are still representative of disproportionate effects 
across the fictitious boundaries assumed to exist in the three level conflict model.  
General Charles Krulak artfully made this point as commandant of the Marine 
Corps in his concept of a ‘Strategic Corporal’. 
In future wars, tremendous capability and lethality will be in the 
hands of the young corporal.  Combine that with the immediate 
"CNN effect," and it turns some of those actions into strategic 
actions.  That young NCO needs to be highly trained because what 
he does or fails to do may literally impact national policy. (Krulak, 
1998) 
The “Strategic Corporal” has such a powerful effect on all levels of war precisely 
because the levels themselves are an artificial construction inherent in the 
intellectual choices about conflict.  This artificiality is inculcated into American 
officers, but Information Age conflicts will more than likely not conform to a 
three level construct. 
Sun Tzu admonishes if you “know the enemy and know yourself, the 
victory is not at risk.  If you know the Heaven and you know the Ground, the 
victory is complete.” (Tzu, Sun)  However, the ability to “know” is first 
predicated on an ability to map new information into an existing mental 
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framework.  Unfortunately there is an adage, “If your only tool is a hammer, 
every problem looks like a nail.”  Thus, the current education system for military 
officers is arming them with a hammer to tackle complicated problems that 
might require new tools and specifically a new cognitive model in order to 
“know” Information Age opponents.  This leaves a vast majority of American 
military officers with an education in strategy that is poorly aligned with the 
nature of future opponents. 
Furthermore, how can a military system and bureaucracy spawned under 
a three level model create orders and plans that lead to victory in wars defined 
by a different set of rules?  Unfortunately, the problem of how we have always 
done it is reflected in the exhaustive process for articulating military options.  
The remainder of this section will analyze the detrimental effect an illusory three 
level conflict model has had on the American military planning process and the 
misalignment between current doctrine and future requirements. 
The axis of Information Age attack may not be apparent until the threat is 
imminent.  The nature of the threat itself is uncertain.  And, an attacker’s very 
identity may not present itself until after an attack begins, or could remain 
cloaked forever.3  However, the current Joint Planning Process emphasizes 
gathering information before conflict begins, analyzing it and presenting options 
that lead through objectives all the way to conflict resolution.  The output of this 
process should be a scheme to synchronize the requirements necessary to put the 
plan in motion.  Joint Publication 5.0, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning 
declares the fundamentals of a campaign planning include the following 
characteristics. 
• Identify any forces or capabilities that the adversary has in 
the area. 
• Identify the adversary strategic and operational centers of 
gravity and provide guidance for defeating them. 
                                                 
3 For example, Moonlight Maze, a sophisticated computer network attack spanning 
several years was never officially attributed to any individual or organization.   
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• Clearly define what constitutes success, including conflict 
termination objectives and potential post hostilities 
activities. (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2002) 
How can the forces of the adversary be identified and quantified when the very 
identity of the adversary remains concealed?  How can centers of gravity be 
determined when the motivations, organization and resources of the adversary 
are hidden from view?  How can objectives be set and post hostilities considered 
when the scope and strength of the adversary may not be fully known?  The very 
nature of this process demands a great deal of information up front that will 
probably not be available when an Information Age threat materializes from a 
previously unsuspected region of the world or worse, is shielded by the fog of 
cyberspace.  In this dynamic environment, anticipating all possible moves by the 
adversary is no longer a plausible planning tool.       
John Arquilla and David Ronfeld have drawn an extended analogy 
between industrial age processes that try to control for the maximum number of 
variables with the linear threats presented in classical chess. (Arquilla, 1997)  In 
chess, pieces move in predetermined patterns and traverse across the board in 
linear segments.  The goal of the game is isolation and imminent capture of a 
single high-value piece, the King.  To accomplish this goal an opponents 
defensive forces must usually be attrited to allow sufficient maneuver room for 
pressuring the King’s terminal defenses and subsequently checkmating his 
position.  In a chess game “there are about 1040 possible positions; in most of 
them, one side is hopelessly lost.” (Beeler, 1972)  With the power of modern 
computing this finite number of possible moves can be optimized and computers 
now defeat the human chess world champion. (Newsweek, 1999)  For military 
officers versed in air power theory this sequential process is clearly reminiscent 
of integrated air defense rollback followed by strategic attack and the subsequent 
checkmate of an opponent’s critical infrastructure causing capitulation and 
acceptance of political demands. (Worden, )  
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Arquilla and Ronfeldt artfully contrast this style of fighting with the Asian 
game of Go.  In Go, there are no high-value pieces.  Each individual piece has the 
same value and action can occur anywhere on the board throughout the game.  
This uncertainty about initial conditions and non-linearity of movement create 
orders of magnitude more possible board positions in Go than in chess. 
(Worden)  Furthermore, the number of positions on which the game can turn in 
the losing opponents favor is also dramatically higher.  This explosion of 
complexity brought on by the nonlinear rules of Go leaves computers at a 
disadvantage to a human play with only modest amounts of skill.  Such modest 
players routinely defeat the best computers, which cannot apply deterministic 
mathematics to the sheer volume of possible solutions.  In fact a significant 
reward still exists for the first person to design a Go program that can beat a top-
level player. (Russell and Norvig, p. 139)   
The exploding level of uncertainty in Go and the inability to coordinate 
operations based on past observations is eerily similar to the new competitive 
landscape for conflict.  Go contains an enormous increase in the number of threat 
options available compared to chess and parallels the exponential increase in 
threats brought about by the empowerment of individuals.  Furthermore, the 
ability of Go players to set pieces anywhere on the board is reminiscent of 
independent range and accuracy.  Go suggests that brute force optimization, 
reliant on exhaustive planning, is inappropriate for dealing with high 
uncertainty. 
In conclusion, the way we have always done it no longer seems like an 
optimal solution for fighting networks.  Although it is now possible to strike 
whenever and wherever desired, there are two serious gaps in the application of 
this force.  First, the American model of conflict leads to a rigid concept of 
warfare that is increasingly irrelevant.  And second, the existing planning 
process is not aligned with the nature of the adversaries America will likely face.   
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B. DEALING WITH UNCERTAINTY 
Military planning in the Information Age is beset with challenges.  There 
are a host of information requirements that will not be met, and yet a very real 
mandate to employ force.  Carl Von Clausewitz wrote that “everything in war is 
very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.  The difficulties accumulate and 
end by producing a kind of friction. . . .  This tremendous friction . . . is 
everywhere in contact with chance, and brings about effects that cannot be 
measured, just because they are largely due to chance.” (Clausewitz, 1984)  
However, the application of precision firepower requires the selection of 
precision targets despite friction and uncertainty.  The challenge therefore, boils 
down to finding targets in an organization that is not arrayed on the battlefield, 
but rather the organization is lurking in cyberspace or integrated into global 
civilization.   
Recall that a core feature of Information Age conflict is a very limited 
ability to predict what will be attacked, when attacks will come, and worse, who 
is committing attacks in progress.  For example, the international denial of 
service attack by the computer viruses NIMDA caused “damage that was 
estimated in the billions of dollars” according to Richard Clarke, chairman of the 
President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board. (Schwartz, 2002)  However, 
“the creator of NIMDA, which attacked computers and installed ‘back doors’ for 
subsequent hacker attacks, has never been identified.” (Schwartz, 2002)  While 
simple denial of service attacks may not warrant military action, the ability of 
such perpetrators to remain anonymous in indicative of the elusive threats that 
American forces will soon be called to confront.  The success of such actors to 
execute successful attacks and remain concealed creates a bleak outlook on the 
ability to “know.”  Such failure to discover targets demands an exploration of 
emerging science with the goal of discovering mathematics to shed light on the 
dark uncertainty created by empowered individuals. 
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Ideally, science would reveal a process for applying American advantage 
in firepower to overcome the shortfalls of an irrelevant perspective and an ill 
suited planning process.  Despite the uncertainty created by empowered 
individuals the authors of this thesis wanted hard science to provide the 
foundation for a targeting strategy applicable across a greatly expanded threat 
spectrum.  However, the presence of human beings is the only feature common 
to every fantastic threat that might emerge.   
At first, presence of human beings seemed obvious, and somewhat 
useless.  Of course, there are going to be human beings behind future attacks, but 
this doesn’t provide much of a foundation for the application of force designed 
to reveal the identity of those humans.  However, diligent research on this 
subject revealed that network science and the emerging field of network 
mathematics can illuminate natural laws of human organizations that are 
exploitable for targeting. 
In 1998, Hawoong Jeong created a web robot to map out the World Wide 
Web for Albert-László Barabási’s research group at the University of Notre 
Dame. (Barabási, p. 220)  Barabási was researching networks and wanted to 
know what the structure of the Internet looked like.  However, when Jeong’s 
robot returned it painted a picture that ran counter to fifty years of theory.  The 
network returned by Jeong’s robot revealed  
…a hierarchy of hubs that keep these networks together, a heavily 
connected node closely followed by several less connected ones, 
trailed by dozens of even smaller nodes.  No central node sits in the 
middle of the spider web, controlling and monitoring every link 
and node.  There is no single node whose removal could break the 
web.  A scale-free network is a web without a spider. (Barabási) 
The term scale-free used by Barabási is worth further explanation.  Most 
natural systems exhibit some scale.  For example, human IQ is one of the most 
well known distributions.  The median or average IQ is 100 and the standard 
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deviation is 15. (Devore, 2000)  Similarly, human height ranges between an 
absolute maximum of 7.5 feet and a minimum of 3.5 feet.  Distributed among 
these extremes the majority of men and women fall in the middle.  This means is 
that human height and IQ have a scale, with most individuals normally 
distributed in the middle of the scale and a much smaller number of individuals 
at the extremes of intelligence and height. 
Measurement errors in scientific experiments, anthropometric 
measurements on fossils, reaction times in psychological 
experiments, measurements of intelligence and aptitude, scores on 
various tests, and numerous economic measure and indicators.  
Even when the underlying distribution is discrete, the normal 
curve often gives an excellent approximation.  In addition, even 
when the individual variables themselves are not normally 
distributed, sums and averages of the variables will under suitable 
conditions have approximately a normal distribution. (Devore, p. 
159) 
Normally distributed systems are 
so prevalent in nature that we often take 
them for granted.  However, changes to 
this norm would be immediately 
apparent.  For example, if human height 
were a scale free system, then every once 
in a while you would meet a 200 foot tall 
person.  In keeping with this tradition 
nearly all science of networks prior to 
Barabási’s work had assumed nodes in a 
network conformed to a normal 
distribution.  Some nodes would be a little more connected to others, but all of 
them would fall within some random scattering around an average.  Imagine the 















overturned everything that had been previously assumed about network 
topology. 
Since Barabási’s breakthrough work in 1998 networks are pervading every 
element of scientific discussion and even pop culture.  “At the heart of Internet 
research and cell biology, the questions are similar.  The first step is to map out 
the network behind these systems.  Then 
from these maps we need to infer the 
laws that govern the network.” (Barabási, p. 193)  In popular culture the Six 
Degrees of Kevin Bacon game, in which players try to link any actor in 
Hollywood to Kevin Bacon through associations with other actors, was 
immensely popular at college campuses and even morphed into an extremely 
trafficked website. (Barabási , p. 62)  Similarities exist between college drinking 
games, the Internet and cancer research because Barabási’s findings highlight 
new fundamental characteristics of the natural world. 
 
 
Figure 2.   The Birth of a Scale Free Network.   
The scale-free topology is a natural consequence of the ever-expanding nature of real networks.  
Starting from two connected nodes (top left), in each panel a new node (shown as an empty 
circle) is added to the network.  When deciding where to link, new nodes prefer to attach to the 
more connected nodes.  Thanks to growth and preferential attachment, a few highly connected 
hubs emerge. [From :Barabási, 2002, p. 87] 
 
Scale-free networks are created when systems grow over time and have a 
preferential attachment system for new nodes. (Barabási, p. 86)  Two 
Figure 1.   Normal Distribution. 
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characteristics govern scale-free systems.  First, all nodes in the system cannot be 
present at the organizing moment.  Rather, nodes are added in succession and 
the network must grow over time.  Second, when new nodes join the system they 
do not randomly connect.  Instead nodes have a preference for attaching to a 
particular node over others.  These preferred nodes are said to have “high 
fitness.” (Barabási, p. 96)  Together these two governing rules determine that 
most natural systems have a network topology.    
Networks are by their very nature the fabric of most complex 
systems, and nodes and links deeply infuse all strategies aimed at 
approaching our interlocked universe. (Barabási , p. 222) 
So when looking for commonality to describe the nature of emergent 
threats in Information Age conflict, inevitable human involvement provides a 
network topology.  Well before Information Age threats organize for the final 
execution of their attack they must organize, train and prepare.  Whether the 
threat is cyber attack, terrorism or economic sabotage human beings behind the 
attack must develop plans, study the target and gather resources.  Bonnie 
Erickson’s study of secret societies reveal that this activity is coordinated among 
individuals with trusted prior contacts. (Erickson, pp. 188-210)  Each successive 
contact within a closed system adds a new link in the social network of the 
attacking organization.  Because these organizations are built over time, the 
growth criterion for scale-free networks is satisfied.  Secondly, the authors 
propose that new members joining an organization have a natural desire to 
attach themselves with the most influential member.  For example, a new recruit 
into Al Queda would more than likely aspire to work at Bin Laden’s right hand.  
This gives Bin Laden a very high fitness in the system and satisfies the criterion 
that a preferential attachment system probably exists in future adversaries.  With 
the two criteria met for scale-free systems American military planners now know 
a great deal about the organizing principles behind the immediately visible 
attackers.   
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Following the terror attacks on September 11th, 2001, Valdis Krebs, a 
management consultant who normally uses network theory to analyze corporate 
communications produced a map of the terrorists’ “covert network using data 
available from news sources on the World Wide Web.” (Krebs, 2003)  His work 
clearly shows a scale-free system with Mohammad Atta as the dominant hub. 
 
Figure 3.   September 11th Highjackers Organization (From: Valdis, Krebs). 
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Krebs’ work is chilling validation that terrorist organizations form scale-
free networks.  However, as Barabási’s shows, any system that grows over time 
and has preferential attachment will form a scale-free network.  Since 
Information Age threats will be composed of individuals that plan and organize 
before they reveal themselves, discoveries about the strengths and weakness of 
the scale-free topology provide critical insights necessary to fight in the 
Information Age.  Therefore, a strategy for targeting networks will create a 
foundation for attacking the wide variety of threats plausible in the Information 
Age.   
Finally, it is an important point to mention that Krebs’ network map was 
built over the course of several months following one of the most intensive 
investigations the world has ever seen.  It is completely feasible that the pace of 
learning acceptable for Krebs will not be fast enough to respond to future threats.  
Therefore, any targeting strategy for networks must not only illuminate ways to 
defeat these organizations, but also provide a way to learn about them faster. 
C. TARGETING NETWORKS 
When Information Age threats are discovered a nation-state has several 
instruments of power at its disposal.  These tools include political, economic, 
military and law enforcement actions.  However, when the damage is great or 
the threat is grave military force must provide a final decisive tool against 
external threats.  The American people should expect no less than it military be 
capable of “defending the of engaging “all enemies both foreign and domesting.”  
Therefore, military forces must ready themselves for war against networks; wars 
in which traditional notions of territory, victory and battle may not apply.  To 
address this threat the aforementioned network structure of potential adversaries 
provides a common similarity between the diverse threats that could materialize 
in the near future.  This section will address the inherent strengths of networks 
and then focus on the ineluctable weakness of scale-free systems – reliance on 
hubs for connectivity.  This weakness presents a salient targeting fundamental 
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and the appropriate focus for network attack.  However, it also introduces 
another challenge.  If hubs are the target, how do you find hubs? 
It is not an accident that natural systems form scale-free networks.  This 
organizational form presents an enormous advantage in a dangerous world.  
Loosely connected nodes make up the majority of a scale-free network.  Then 
connecting many nodes, the system hubs act as the gateway connecters between 
different parts of the system.  When random failure occurs in a scale free system 
there is a high probability that one of the nodes will fail and not a hub. 
If I blindly pick ten balls from a bag in which there are 10 red and 
9,990 white balls, chances are ninety-nine in a hundred that I will 
have only white balls in my hand.  Therefore, if failures in 
networks affect with equal chance all nodes, small nodes are far 
more likely to be dismantled, since there are many more of them. 
(Barabási , p. 114) 
The result of this resilience is that scale-free systems are extremely fault 
tolerant.  Whether the system under random attack is cancer, a pack of water 
buffalo or the Internet the scale-free topology ensures that the system will 
survive the loss of many nodes.  However, concentrating responsibility on the 
hubs to support the network also creates a serious vulnerability of network 
systems under deliberate attack.  “Taking out a hierarchy of highly connected 
hubs will break any system.” (Barabási , p. 121)  
For example, the Internet is extremely fault tolerant.  At any given time 
there are hundreds of malfunctioning electronic routers responsible for passing 
messages.  However, the system continues to provide uninterrupted service 
because the hubs of the Internet route traffic around the failing nodes.  On the 
other hand deliberate attack against the hubs of the Internet could bring the 
entire web to its knees.  In October of 2002 an attack attempted to do exactly this.  
The article explaining the attack highlights this vulnerability.  “Most of the 
Internet’s traffic must pass through one of several dozen core routers, and if they 
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were somehow crippled simultaneously, the Net would grind to a halt.” 
(Sullivan, 2003)  The question remaining addresses whether hub attack against a 
human organization will produce the same detrimental failures? 
Kathleen Carley of Carnegie Mellon University notes that isolation 
strategies against network organizations produce significant performance 
degradations. (Carley)  Going back to Valdis Krebs’ map of the September 11th 
highjackers he points out  
We do not know all of the internal ties of the highjackers’ network, 
but it appears that many of the ties were concentrated around the 
pilots.  This is a risky move for a covert network.  Concentrating 
both unique skills and connectivity in the same nodes makes the 
network easier to disrupt – once it is discovered. (Krebs, p. 14) 
Although these examples show that disruption decreases organization 
performance, the term “decreased performance” may not have the same military 
appeal as “unconditional surrender.”  However, military planners must learn to 
adapt expectations for conflict termination to the reality of new adversaries.  In 
the United States’ global war with Al Queda it is highly unlikely that a surrender 
document or peace treaty will ever be signed.  The war aim is suppression, 
annihilation and decreased organizational performance.  Similar to attacks on the 
Internet, the goal is to bring Al Queda to its knees, but we may never fully 
eradicate the organization.  Therefore, the American military must constantly 
seek to employ the advantages of independent range and accuracy against the 
universal weakness of scale-free networks – the hubs.  
With network hubs identified as the target for American firepower, the 
next question is “Where are the hubs?”  Krebs suggests that the best possible 
course of action for this task is to identify possible suspects then observe them to 
see where those leads connect. (Krebs, p. 15)  Additionally, he is adamant that 
the “best method is for diverse intelligence agencies to aggregate their individual 
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information into a larger emergent map.” (Krebs, p. 15)  However, in a military 
context this strategy is not satisfying. 
Krebs opinion is plagued by the failure to apply military thinking to a 
problem that has traditionally been regarded in criminal terms.   
In other words, our leaders (and we as their citizens) have in the 
past been, and in disturbing numbers remain, prepared to treat 
terrorists as being on par with smugglers, drug traffickers, or, at 
most, some kind of political mafiosi, rather than what they have in 
fact been for almost half a century: organized, highly trained, 
hugely destructive paramilitary units that were and are conducting 
offensive campaigns against a variety of nations and social systems.  
In truth, international terrorism has always been what its 
perpetrators have so often insisted: a form of warfare.  And 
although American leaders and the international media were more 
than willing after the September 11 attacks to announce that the 
United States was in fact at war, a truly unified, comprehensive and 
resolute military strategy for conducting war was slow in 
formulation and has proved difficult to maintain.  Confusion and 
arguments over terms and concepts, goals and strategies, have 
hampered the prosecution of America’s response from the start. 
(Carr, 2002) 
The authors contend the reason for confusion and the lack of coherent 
strategy is due to a missing cognitive framework in the U.S. military for fighting 
networks, and a planning process that is not aligned for iterative battle against a 
dynamic system.  Therefore, the problem in Krebs’ solution is that it yields too 
much initiative to the adversary. 
One of the first things every midshipman learns in their initial year at 
Annapolis is that you never yield the initiative. (Clark, 2001)  When mining a 
huge database or waiting to “see where it leads,” significant observation of the 
network is only possible when the nodes act.  Thus the adversary has the 
initiative because they are setting the timetable for observable opportunities.  
Krebs even points out that “unlike normal social networks, strong ties [between 
nodes] remain mostly dormant and hidden to outsiders.” (Krebs, p. 14)  
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Furthermore, the adversary determines the conditions, timing and method of 
communication.  With so many advantages leaning toward the adversary even a 
first year midshipmen should figure out that this tactic is too dependent on a 
cooperative target to form the foundation of a coherent military strategy for 
defeating networks. 
Krebs is not alone in his opinion that better surveillance and better 
databases are the keys to defeating future adversaries.  The Defense Advanced 
Research Project Office (DARPA) recently received funding to build a Total 
Information Awareness (TIA) system that will “demonstrate innovative 
information technologies to detect terrorist groups planning attacks against 
American citizens, anywhere in the world.” (DARPA)  Senator Richard Shelby, 
Vice Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hailed TIA as 
…precisely the kind of innovative ‘out of the box’ thinking of 
which I have long been speaking – and which American have a 
right to expect from their Intelligence Community in the wake of a 
devastating surprise attack that left 3,000 of their countrymen dead. 
(Shelby) 
However, reactive measures like data mining and better surveillance allow the 
adversary to control too many variables.  Furthermore, it leaves the U.S. on a 
permanent defensive, awaiting the next attack or move the adversary.  This is not 
only an uncomfortable waiting game.  It also runs counter to the last fifty years 
of strategic thought that prizes the offensive.   
The balance between offense and defense in warfare has occasionally 
shifted advantage from attackers to defenders and vice versa.  Beginning in the 
mid 1800’s defense had a clear advantage on the battlefield.  For example, the 
gruesome losses of the Union Army attacking Lee’s Army of Virginia during the 
American Civil War were a bellwether of the defensive strength afforded by 
rifled guns.  Later, in World War I the absolute failure of maneuver on the 
battlefield and the subsequent stalemate between trenched forces was a direct 
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result of a defensive machine gun’s to cut attacking infantry units to bits.  
However, when the German army pioneered the integration of radios, aircraft 
and tanks and a new organizational structure into Panzer divisions maneuver 
gave advantage back to the offense.  This was convincingly demonstrated by the 
rapid fall of France in 1940 despite millions of French francs poured into 
defensive fortifications at the Maginot Line.  There is no evidence to suggest that 
new technology or doctrine has shifted advantage back to the defense. In fact, 
this thesis has adamantly argued that America’s unique advantage in the 
Information Age is the ability to take the offensive with independently operable 
targeting and engagement systems.  Therefore, ceding the initiative to terrorists, 
hackers or other network adversaries is tantamount to taking the strategic 
defensive, waiting patiently for them to make the first move.  This is not to 
suggest that better surveillance and advanced databases are not useful tools, but 
rather a defensive strategy does not address the threat.  Power in the Information 
Age resides in maintaining the offensive:  finding a way to attack while learning 
about hidden nodes. 
Another key statement from Krebs’ outstanding work on the September 
11th organization is “The less active the network, the more difficult it is to 
discover.” (Krebs, p. 14)  Obviously the antithesis to this statement also holds 
true.  The more active the network is, the easier it is to discover.  However, this is 
not the steady state for a covert network.  Covert networks actively pursue 
secrecy and thus communicate only when absolutely necessary to coordinate 
activity. (Baker and Faulkner, pp. 837-860)  Therefore, stimulus that creates 
higher network communication activity has a concomitant effect of increasing 
the observable signal strength of network participants.  Because communications 
across the network will more than likely travel through one or more hubs to 
reach its destination, the secret to finding hubs is to get the nodes 
communicating. 
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The authors term this targeting strategy “Stimulus Based Discovery.”  We 
claim that networks can be stimulated to reveal their topology and in so doing 
provide a map of targets for the application of force.  Additionally, the authors 
claim that stimulus based discovery leads to targeting information faster than 
stand-off observation or other methods that rely on the adversary to 
communicate at their leisure.   
Stimulating a network and forcing nodes to compensate for changes in the 
environment enhances the effectiveness of an observation system because the 
search parameters can be narrowed.  For example, eliminating a terrorist 
network’s financier would force cell operatives to seek out other methods of 
acquiring money.  This could take several forms such as credit card fraud, bank 
robbery or attempts to make contact with financiers they are unfamiliar with.  
Whereas it might be very difficult to intercept communications between a 
terrorist cell leader and a financier with whom he shares a long personal history 
the difficulty of detection is reduced if the cell if forced to conduct visibility 
activities to raise finances.  In this example there are already systems in place to 
detect credit card fraud and armed robbery, and these higher “signal strength” 
activities are more easily detected than covert communications between old 
friends. Similarly seeking out a new financier requires adding new links to the 
network that therefore makes the network more detectable.  With a stimulus 
based strategy as the organizing principle for redefining attack, a tool like TIA 
becomes very important in detecting the results of stimulus.   
The options for orienting intelligence collection are large, but when the 
network is stimulated by U.S. action the search for observable activity can be 
focused, and with the addition of only a few scaling parameters the likelihood of 
detection should improve.  In March of 2003, this exact phenomenon was on 
display in the high profile hunt for the leaders of Al Qaida and the capture of 
operations chieftain Khalid Shaikh Mohammad.  
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Officials at the National Security Agency also listened attentively to 
their vast global array of electronic eavesdropping satellites, 
waiting for an expected flurry of e-mails and cell phone calls 
among Al-Qaida members.  Authorities watched for the movement 
of cell members seeking cover, particularly those believed to be 
direct contact with Mohammad. (Myer) 
In this case discovery then fuels more accurate stimulus creating a chain of 
stimulus/reaction pairs leading to a quicker map of the network topology.   
The questions in this thesis began with an examination of two 
characteristics that will define Information Age warfare.  First, the list of possible 
threats faced by future U.S. forces will be dramatically larger than the state-
centric threats of the Industrial Age.  This additional complexity is brought on 
because the flow of power to individuals allows small groups to endanger states 
in a way that has not existed for over three hundred years.  Second, advances in 
information technology and refined processes for the application of force allow 
U.S. military units to break the historical link between range and accuracy.  With 
precision-guided weapons it is now possible to operate targeting and 
engagement system in separate locations within unique processes.  However, the 
application of this force could be rendered less effective without new concepts to 
identify valid targets among networked adversaries that will likely be 
misunderstood by Industrial Age metrics.  
Unfortunately, in a well-intentioned effort to expose more military officers 
to classical works on strategy and operational art the professional education 
curriculum has reduced warfare to a cookie cutter formula.  This gross 
simplification does little to inculcate America’s warriors with a new mindset to 
fight networks.  Furthermore, the planning processes that exist are not aligned to 
leverage America’s strengths against new adversaries that do not conform to 
traditional measures for evaluating an adversary state.  To compensate for this 
shortfall, new findings in network science demonstrate that human systems built 
over time self-organize into scale-free networks.  These networks are composed 
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of nodes and links with some high fitness nodes, called hubs, that acquire an 
extraordinary number of links while most nodes remain loosely connected.  
Scale-free systems are extremely robust to random failure, but are susceptible to 
focused attack against the hubs that hold the system together.  America’s 
independent targeting and engagement systems are ideally suited to attack the 
hubs in such a network, but finding the hubs presents a daunting challenge.   
Current efforts to find the influential members in a network organization 
rely on improvements to existing systems in information management and 
surveillance.  However, this solution contains two significant flaws.  First, this 
approach cedes initiative to the adversary, and second, it requires a defensive 
strategy when there is no evidence to suggest defense is the stronger form of 
warfare in the Information Age. 
Another way of finding hubs proposed by the authors is called, Stimulus 
Based Discovery.  In this form of learning, hubs are found by stimulating the 
network to increase the amount of detectable activity.  This detection enhances 
the capability to detect nodes and hubs by focusing collection in time and space 
to the likely network response to stimulus.  And most of all, Stimulus Based 
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III. CASE STUDIES IN STIMULUS BASED DISCOVERY 
Stimulus Based Discovery seeks to map the hubs and nodes in a network 
faster than standoff observation.  Rather than put surveillance in place and watch 
a suspected node to learn its connections, Stimulus Based Discovery requires the 
observer to act in a way that forces a reaction from the node under observation.  
The exact nature of this reaction may be unknown, but several possible reactions 
can usually be anticipated.  Thus, surveillance tools can be focused to look for the 
expected reactions, and increase the likelihood of detecting denied information.  
Moreover, the observer is now actively setting the pace and schedule for 
observable events and putting his opponent on the defensive.   
Kenneth Waltz states the value of a model in political science is based on 
its ability to explain or at least predict. (Waltz, 1979)  Therefore, if Stimulus Based 
DiscoverY is to be seriously considered as a theory and strategy for Information 
Age conflict it should explain several historical case studies.  This chapter 
establishes the validity of Stimulus Based Discovery by using it to explain past 
events.  However, before addressing specific examples, it is important to discuss 
exactly what stimulus consists of in the context of this theory. 
Stimulating the adversary network has already been defined as some 
action that increases the ability to detect and map the nodes and hubs in scale-
free networks by generating increased observable activity in the system.  There 
are many forms stimulus can take, but it must be directed at either nodes or 
links.  For example, stimulus applied to a terrorist network might eliminate one 
of the terrorist nodes and thereby force the system to adapt to the loss.  Affecting 
a link could mean denying the communication signal between two nodes by 
jamming or destroying the communication infrastructure required to complete 
the message.  Both of these examples require explicit denial or removal of the 
node or link.  In these examples the physical terrorist agent is removed or the 
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actual communication system is suppressed.  Therefore, one way of affecting 
nodes and links is to change explicit physical reality.  An explicit effect destroys 
or disables a node or link. 
Nodes and links can also be cognitively distorted as well as eliminated 
from the explicit physical world.  While explicit stimulus of nodes and links can 
have outstanding results for network discovery, cognitive distortion attacks on 
the network generates equally positive results in mapping the nodes and hubs of 
a scale-free system.  Therefore, there are four different ways to stimulate a 
network.  The four method; explicit nodal stimulus (quadrant I), explicit link 
stimulus (quadrant II), cognitive nodal distortion (quadrant III) and cognitive 
link distortion (quadrant IV) are each depicted below. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Stimulus Matrix with Four Possible Tactics. 
 
Examples later in the chapter will examine case studies from each 
quadrant, but as an introduction to the idea of explicit and cognitive stimulus 
consider the following example.  Suppose you were the target of a Stimulus 
Based Discovery attack with the objective of eliminating your professional 
network.  Also assume that surveillance inside your office is denied for some 
reason (simulating a difficult to penetrate organization).  So simply watching you 
at work is not an option for mapping your network.  With direct observation at 
work unavailable, you can still be stimulated with a tactic from each quadrant 
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and this will lead to a map of your organization’s structure.  For example, an 
explicit nodal stimulus, such as killing or kidnapping you (quadrant I) would 
stimulate your professional network.  Later that day this stimulus would cause 
another node to emerge from a co-worker or superior that calls your house to 
find out why you didn’t show up for work.  Similarly, you are probably linked to 
your job by the car you drive to the office.  If that car were explicitly disabled 
(quadrant II) you would probably call your boss to tell them you were going to 
be late, and if you had a client meeting or worked in a team of other employees 
you would probably call them too.  This stimulus would force you to 
communicate and present an opportunity to add another node or two to the 
map.  To conduct this communication, you might e-mail, call on your house 
phone or even use your cell phone.  Explicit link stimulus could also include 
disabling one or more of those communication systems to funnel your 
connection onto to the exact path, such as your cell phone, which has the most 
penetrated surveillance.  Thereby enabling the highest fidelity intercepts of the 
people you communicate with and adding your closest links to the network map.  
Now consider how you could be stimulated in the cognitive domain.  If 
you were somehow convinced through a false weather report or a deceitful 
phone call that you did not have to come into work this morning (quadrant III) 
then cognitively distorting reality perceived by your node would generate the 
same result as explicitly disabling you.  Someone at the office that knows you do 
not really have the day off will inevitably call to inquire why you are not at 
work.  If surveillance is ready to intercept this communication then the distortion 
between your perception of reality and the explicit reality known by other nodes 
(your co-workers in this case) serves to successfully add another link to the map.  
Finally, you are linked to your coworkers and superiors on many different 
channels in both the physical and the intangible realm.  These links include 
telephone connections, e-mail correspondence, and even the highway that leads 
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from your home to your office.  Suppose a link between you and your business 
associates was exploited to create a cognitive reality that was not aligned with 
the explicit situation (quadrant IV).  For example, e-mail could be sent to 
everyone in your address book announcing your sudden resignation.  Many in 
your company receiving the e-mail might not even know who you are, and they 
would quickly delete the mail.  However, your boss and your closest co-workers 
would most assuredly be concerned with your sudden shift in attitude.  Many 
would immediately write back to you or call you on the phone to discuss your 
situation.  You might tell them it was all a hoax, but if surveillance were in place 
the map would already include each respondent and perhaps some additional 
information that annotates your relationship with them based on the tone of their 
reply. 
In the opposite case, where stimulus based techniques are not employed, 
the learning process is more likely to proceed at a slower pace with less certainty 
about connections.  If your home phone were covertly tapped along with your e-
mail then surveillance teams would listen for clues that demonstrate who you 
are connected with at work.  However, if you are like most people you do not 
call work in the morning unless something is out of the ordinary and you do not 
call after you leave because you just spent all day there.  If they watch who you 
go to lunch with you might spend that time with an associate from a different 
department that has nothing to do with your professional network, or worse, 
you may go to the gym everyday and grab a sandwich on the way back without 
talking to anyone about who you know at the office.  There are literally millions 
of situations that could arise in a surveillance problem, but it follows logic that 
Stimulus Based Discovery maps a network faster and more accurately.  
However, logic alone does not demonstrate the theory in practice.  Therefore, 
case studies follow for each type of stimulus discussed in the previous example. 
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A. MEDELLÍN DRUG CARTELS (QUADRANT I) 
In 1989 the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. Special Forces began 
covert operations in Columbia to assist the national government’s effort to 
enforce the rule of law on the cocaine cartels.  “In the fall of 1989, the U.S. 
embassy in Bogatá was not sure exactly how the Medellín cartel worked, or even 
who was in charge” (Bowden, 2001).  The leading assumption was that an 
individual named José Rodríguez Gacha was in charge of the cartel.  Therefore, 
Gacha was the first target for U.S. covert surveillance in Columbia and was 
quickly located by U.S. Special Forces communications operatives.  Gacha’s 
location was passed on to Columbian National Police who, despite a bungled 
first attempt, successfully killed Gacha with assault helicopters.  This action 
explicitly removed Gacha from the cartel network. 
Although it was not intended, Gacha’s death provided an ideal stimulus 
in the leadership network of the Medellín cartel.  “His death prompted a torrent 
of phone calls to and from Pablo Escobar” (Bowden, p. 83).  The cartel was 
reacting to the stimulus and reorganizing itself after the loss of a key participant.  
In this flurry of activity it became clear that Gacha was an important member of 
the cartel, but certainly not the kingpin.   
The more [U.S. Special Forces] listened over the next few weeks, the 
more they realized that Pablo [Escobar] had been the man in charge 
all along.  Always deeply concerned about his public image, he had 
evidently been content to let Gacha be perceived as the chief bad 
guy (Bowden, p. 84). 
This example demonstrates several important characteristics about 
Stimulus Based Discovery.  First, U.S. information on the cartel was minimal and 
the little bit that was known pointed to the wrong person as the network hub.  
Second, prior to the stimulus ties between Gacha and Escobar were strong but 
dormant.  And, as pointed out by Valdis Krebs in his discussion of the September 
11th highjackers, strong ties in criminal organizations are likely to remain 
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“dormant and hidden to outsiders.” (Krebs, p. 14)  Therefore, prior to Gacha’s 
death, Escobar was able to mount a successful misinformation campaign by 
ensuring that the abundance of information continually pointed to Gacha as the 
cartel hub.  Only when the network was stimulated, did Pablo Escobar emerge as 
the cartel leader.  Stimulating the Medellín drug cartel by explicitly removing a 
node exposed the structure that Pablo Escobar was trying to keep masked.   
B. STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM (QUADRANT II) 
Terror networks represent one of the clearest examples of strategic threats 
that organize and prepare outside the bounds of the state-centric model.  
However, it is common knowledge that many states encourage, and in many 
cases support terrorist organizations.  Therefore, a link exists between some 
states and the terrorist networks they sponsor.  President George Bush brought 
this point to the forefront of America’s ongoing war against terror in his 
September 20th, 2001 speech.  
We will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism.  
Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make.  Either 
you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.  From this day 
forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism 
will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime. (Bush, 
George) 
The strong stance against state sponsored terrorism is justified because 
nations that provide safe haven for terrorists link these network threats with the 
resource gathering capabilities of states.  The combination of a state’s resources 
and a terrorist organization’s ability to strike key interests of its adversaries is a 
dreadful combination.  Therefore, the United States has constantly sought to 
eliminate these links. 
On the late evening of 15 April and early morning of 16 April 1986, 
under the code name El Dorado Canyon, the United States 
launched a series of military air strikes against ground targets 
inside Libya.  The timing of the attack was such that while some of 
the strike aircraft were still in the air, President Reagan was able to 
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address the US public and much of the world.  He emphasized that 
this action was a matter of US self defense against Libya’s state-
sponsored terrorism. In part, he stated, "Self defense is not only our 
right, it is our duty. It is the purpose behind the mission...a mission 
fully consistent with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. (Global Security 
Org) 
President Bush’s clear denunciation of state sponsored terrorism and 
President Reagan’s attack on Libyan support for terrorism both demonstrate 
explicit suppression of a link between states and terrorists represented by 
quadrant II activity in the stimulus based discovery tactics matrix.  This 
suppression has the obvious goal of removing a terrorist organization’s ability to 
gather resources from a state, but also demonstrates stimulus based discovery.   
Once terrorists can no longer rely on a state to funnel finances, logistics 
and arms to their organization, they must satisfy those requirements through 
other methods, which increase the ability to detect nodes in the terror 
organization.  For example, following President Bush’s clear demand for an end 
to state sponsored terrorism the President of Pakistan, General Pervez 
Musharraf, met with his top advisors to discuss Pakistan’s options.  The General 
realized that U.S. dedication to the war on terrorism left no room for Pakistan’s 
longtime support for militant Islamic groups that routinely invaded Indian held 
Kashmir. 
[Musharraf] made his second major policy change, vowing to rid 
his country of Islamic extremists who for years have relied on 
clandestine financial and military support from the army. 
(McCarthy, 2002) 
The result of Musharraf’s policy was that radical groups no longer 
received illicit funding directed to them by the state.  Left without state 
sponsorship network organizations faced an interesting paradox.  To raise 
resources they had to forego secrecy and make public or semi-private requests 
for resources.  In Pakistan this manifested itself in the mosques and bazaars on 
the northeast frontier with Kashmir. 
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Every Friday at lunchtime, as men gather at the mosques near 
Mardan for prayers, a Lashkar commander makes an impassioned 
speech about the fight in Kashmir and openly collects thousands of 
rupees in donations. (McCarthy) 
Network commanders coming out of the mountains to make personal pleas for 
resources clearly demonstrates the effectiveness of explicit suppression on the 
link between states and network threats.  In the Pakistan case, the flow of net 
resources to the terrorists is not overwhelmingly disturbed, but nonetheless, 
nodes in the network are revealed that would have remained deeply buried 
without breaking the link between the Pakistani government and the radical 
network. 
C. OPERATION ‘SHAKE THE TREE’ (QUADRANT III) 
Following the U.S. led victory in the Gulf War to liberate Kuwait the UN 
Security Council passed Resolution 687 on April 3, 1991.  This resolution set forth 
the formal terms for a permanent cease-fire and required Iraq to renounce and 
condemn terrorism, repatriate all prisoners, restore all seized and stolen 
property, establish a fund based on oil revenues as a source for reparations 
payments to Kuwait, accept a continued arms and economic embargo (except on 
food, medicine, and essential civilian needs), and accept international verification 
of its WMD program eradication.  This final element required Iraq to accept the 
destruction, removal, or dismantling of all biological, chemical and nuclear 
weapons; all research, development and support facilities associated with these 
weapons; all stocks of chemical and biological agents; all ballistic missiles with 
ranges exceeding 150 kilometers; and all production and repair facilities 
associated with the manufacturing of such missiles.  It linked Iraqi compliance to 
Iraq’s ability to export oil and other materials by stating that once the Security 
Council verified that Iraq had completed the required actions, the UN 
prohibitions against the export of commodities and products originating in Iraq 
would have no further force or effect (Cordesman, p. 290).  Saddam Hussein 
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accepted Resolution 687 on April 6th, prompting the Security Council to declare a 
formal cease-fire on April 11.   
To assist in the implementation of Resolution 687 the UN established 
United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) for the purpose of planning, 
coordinating and executing the destruction of Iraq’s weapons of mass 
destruction.  Rolf Ekéus, a life-long civil servant known for his diplomatic skills, 
and no-nonsense attitude, was chosen as the executive chairman for UNSCOM.  
Ekéus reported directly to the UN Security Council and had broad authority to 
act independently.  His staff, composed of experienced inspectors and technical 
experts, created a force of inspectors focused on the verifiable disarmament of 
Iraq.  Robert Gallucci, Ekéus’s deputy chairman, points out that the inspections 
carried out under UN Security Council Resolution 687 were not the same as 
IAEA safeguards inspection.  “Those inspections were quite unique and they 
followed from the peace of the victor” (Gallucci, p. 8).  Early on it was clear that 
UNSCOM was putting together a new breed of non-proliferation inspections and 
would settle for nothing less than complete Iraqi compliance with the UN 
Security Council. 
From the beginning, Iraq began to deceive UNSCOM and IAEA in an 
effort to retain control of key elements in their WMD programs.  “As early as 
April 5, 1991, Iraqi forces were detected salvaging equipment for missiles and 
weapons of mass destruction, as well as cleaning up suspect sites” (Cordesman, 
p. 291).  The pattern of Iraqi deceit and deception and reports from UNSCOM 
that Iraq was not fully cooperating resulted in the passage of a stronger UN 
Security Council Resolution on August 15, 1991.  However, the extent of Iraq’s 
deceit was not revealed for the world until August of 1995, when Lieutenant 
General Hussein Kamel defected to Jordan.  Kamel had been a supervising 
minister for military industry and had led part of Iraq’s weapons of mass 
destruction program.  He was also Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law.  Kamel 
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cooperated fully with the media, foreign government intelligence agencies and 
UNSCOM.  “He revealed how Iraq was misleading the United Nations weapons 
inspectors through a systematic program of deception and concealment” (Ritter, 
p. 47).  Despite an Iraqi ‘full, final and complete disclosure’ of its WMD program 
only weeks earlier, Iraq promptly invited Chairman Ekéus back to Baghdad to 
discuss new information.  Eventually these talks led the Iraqis to deliver over a 
million pages of documentation to UNSCOM that were reportedly stored at the 
now defected Kamal’s house.  Kamal’s statements and his document cache 
indicated once and for all that Iraq was successfully concealing its activity and 
that the current method of inspection was not effective. 
Ekéus, UNSCOM’s chairman, estimated that he had been unable to make 
a definitive accounting of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction because their work 
was marginalized by a secret Iraqi concealment organization.  From the Arabic, it 
was called the Apparatus of Special Security, and Saddam Hussein’s younger 
son, Qusay, directed it.  Reporting to the umbrella group were the inner core of 
the president’s protective agencies:  the Special Security Organization, the Special 
Presidential Guard Unit and Special Republican Guard (Gellman, p. 8). 
The concealment organization was obviously not a declared agency of the 
Iraqi government and therefore its nodes and links could operate from the 
shadows to thwart UNSCOM’s progress.  To combat this elusive adversary 
UNSCOM gradually turned its attention away from direct inspection of sites and 
facilities to an indirect study of the concealment organization.   
American Scott Ritter headed the unit tasked with uncovering the secret 
Iraqi organization.  The remainder of the unit consisted of a support staff in New 
York with field agents deployed in Baghdad.  Ritter planned to use this unit to 
observe the Iraqi’s observation to stimulus.  Ritter developed a plan to execute 
what this thesis calls “cognitive nodal distortion” (quadrant III) because Ritter 
intended to create a difference between explicit reality and reality as it was 
50 
understood by his Iraqi handlers and the Apparatus of Special Security.  The 
Iraqi nodes’ perceived reality consisted of routine weapons inspections that they 
had successfully outmaneuvered for five years.  However, Ritter’s explicit reality 
would consist of an extensive surveillance array to detect the communications 
occurring in the hidden organization.  The goal was to conduct a “series of large-
scale inspections to elicit a detectable Iraqi response from the organization that 
was hiding Iraq’s secret arsenal”  (Ritter, p. 136).  Ritter dubbed this tactic 
“Shaking the Tree” and planned to put into practice in UNSCOM inspection 143.  
This plan integrated the work of inspectors on the ground, surveillance aircraft 
overhead and a new element – sensitive communications scanners (Ritter).   
“Shaking the Tree” in UNSCOM 143 did not turn up a smoking gun.  
However, the 143 did set a baseline of data demonstrating how Iraq responded 
and it helped to focus efforts on the Special Republican Guard.  Soon thereafter, 
“Shaking the tree” demonstrated the real power of Stimulus Based discovery in 
June of 1996.  That month UNSCOM 150 targeted a Special Republican Guard 
complex tipped off from UNSCOM 143.  UNSCOM 150 was blocked from their 
inspection site and a standoff ensued.  The Iraqis would not allow inspectors into 
the complex and the UNSCOM inspectors would not back down.  Meanwhile, 
the sophisticated collection plan enabled UNSCOM to listen in on the radio 
communications of the Iraqi concealment organization as they sanitized the 
complex.  
Unfortunately, Iraq was maneuvering politically with members of the 
United Nations Security Council and there was decreasing support for 
aggressive inspections.  While the United States and Great Britain favored 
aggressive disarmament, the other three members of the permanent five – 
Russia, China and France – were less enthusiastic.  Direct confrontation with Iraq 
could provoke a situation in which the Security Council could lose credibility.  
With three of the permanent members favoring diplomacy over confrontation it 
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was not productive to have UNSCOM provoking situations that created 
untenable political complications.  Iraq used this division in the Security Council 
to compel Ekéus into a negotiation on the terms of inspection, titled Special 
Modalities.  This agreement provided Iraq with concessions on prior notification 
and limited access to certain sites.  The Clinton administration was displeased 
with Ekéus’s concessions and political tensions continued to mount.  Therefore, 
when Ekéus’s term expired in the summer of 1997, Washington strongly 
supported the appointment of Richard Butler as the new Executive Chairman of 
UNSCOM.   
Fortunately, Butler was a lifelong arms control proponent of arms control 
and his direct, often caustic nature ensured that UNSCOM would not be deterred 
by Iraqi intransigence.  Butler went so far at to formally create the UNSCOM 
counter concealment unit in August of 1997 (Ritter, p. 136).  However, political 
maneuvers by Iraq had dulled the impact of UNSCOM inspections and in 
November, Iraq declared that it would no longer cooperate with the inspectors.  
But, when the Security Council issued a clear warning the Iraqis withdraw their 
objection and on November 20th Iraq again claimed that it would allow 
unfettered UNSCOM access.  Despite claims for renewed cooperation any 
pretext of mutual respect between the inspectors and their handlers was now 
gone.  The UNSCOM relationship with Iraq was now openly adversarial. 
After a false start in December of 1997, UNSCOM was back in Iraq in 
March of 1998.  The targets of this inspection were several Special Republican 
Guard and Special Security Organization facilities.  The Iraqis were superficially 
cooperative, but the concealment organization was dutifully working to prevent 
any weapons disclosure.  However, this was another “Shake the Tree” operation 
in which Ritter and his team distorted perceived reality in the minds of the 
Iraqis.  While the nodes in the Iraqi concealment organization believed this was 
just another inspection to find contraband, it was in fact a targeted stimulus to 
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illuminate the hidden nodes in Iraq’s apparatus for special security.  The 
communications intercepts confirmed that that the Special Security Organization 
was getting orders from Presidential Secretary Abid Hamid Mahmoud to remove 
and destroy documents prior to the arrival of inspectors.  According to Scott 
Ritter, the lead inspector: 
This spectacular piece of real-time information confirmed two 
things; the involvement of the presidential secretary and the SSO in 
concealment activity, and that the communications monitoring 
program could develop information that would have a meaningful 
impact on the inspection (Ritter, p. 187). 
Unfortunately, “Shaking the tree” created political problems due to the 
success of the technique.  Iraq realized that its complete duplicity was being 
reconfirmed with each passing inspection and the Security Council found itself 
backed into a corner by the confirmation of Iraq’s refusal to comply with UN 
Resolutions.  This confrontation resulted in the August 1998 Iraqi proclamation 
that all cooperation with UNSCOM would cease.  The United States and Great 
Britain responded with a four-day military strike, but no clear resolve to bring 
the Iraqi crisis to conclusion and “Shaking the tree” was over. 
In this case study, “Stimulus Based Discovery” is successfully executed by 
creating distortions between the reality of weapons inspections perceived by 
nodes in the Iraqi Special Security Organization and explicit reality which was 
focused stimulus operations to reveal the hidden organizations topology.  This 
distortion led the Iraqis to behave in a manner that was observable to UN forces 
and these observations led to nodes deep within Saddam Hussein’s declared 
government.  Thus revealing that Presidential Secretary Abid Hamid Mahmoud 





D. D-DAY (QUADRANT IV) 
On June 6th 1944 Allied Forces of World War II launched the largest 
invasion in the history of warfare.  By day’s end an armada of five thousand 
ships put more than two hundred thousand soldiers ashore on the northern coast 
of France.  The invasion to retake Europe was underway.  However, in every 
large human undertaking those in the vanguard experience isolation while 
lighting the path for others.  The invasion of Nazi Europe was no exception.  On 
D-day the task of going in first fell to America’s 82nd and 101st airborne divisions 
whose paratroopers would jump into the night sky above France and secure the 
Allied right Flank near the town of Ste. Mere Elise. 
Gusty winds, German anti-aircraft fire and poor navigation by Allied 
pilots resulted in the American paratroopers getting spread across 35 miles of the 
French countryside.  In the dark night, the paratroopers’ first task was to link up 
with their fellow soldiers.  To accomplish this task each paratrooper carried  
…a few cents worth of tin fashioned in the shape of a child’s 
snapper.  One snap of the cricket had to be answered by a double 
snap. Two snaps required one in reply.  On these signals men came 
out from hiding, from trees and ditches, around the sides of 
buildings, to greet one another. (Ryan, 1959) 
In network parlance, the “click-click” of the tin snapper was a link between 
paratrooper nodes.  The clicking sound linked isolated paratrooper to their units 
and allowed the dispersed and disoriented soldiers to come together. 
If a vital “clicker” link were distorted then it might be possible to learn 
about undiscovered nodes in the paratrooper network.  Unfortunately for many 
paratroopers the bolt-action on the German soldiers’ guns made a nearly 
identical sound to the tin clicker.  In the confusion surrounding the initial jumps 
many paratroopers fell prey to a German trap by walking toward what they 
thought were friendly “clicks.” (Edwards and Morrison, 1994)   
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When a paratrooper incorrectly perceived the German gun breech noises 
as friendly soldiers they responded by double clicking their own crickets.  
Instantly the Wehrmacht soldier that just loaded his rifle understands reality 
with great clarity.  From his perspective there is an armed man in the dark 
clicking some ridiculous toy.  He knows it is not another German so he fires and 
the encounter is over with the young American lying dead probably having 
never fired a shot.  The link distortion stimulus caused the paratrooper to reveal 
himself. 
German soldiers exploited the link connecting paratroopers to one another 
by distorting the perceived reality of the rally signal.  Thus, this short example 
shows a network stimulated to reveal its nodes by distorting the perceived 
reality associated with its linking mechanism.   
This chapter examined four case studies that show Stimulus Based 
Discovery is a valuable strategy to learn about concealed networks.  It works at 
the highest levels of policy severing states from terrorists.  It works in tactical 
engagements when troops are stimulated to reveal their location.  It works in the 
jungles of Columbia against criminal networks, and it works in international 
policy dealing with intransigent states like Iraq.  In every network there is an 
opportunity to employ one of the four tactics:  explicit nodal stimulus, explicit 
link stimulus, cognitive nodal distortion or cognitive link distortion. 
There are dozens more examples of stimulus leading to accelerated 
discovery, but the case studies presented here were chosen specifically to 
highlight the broad applicability of this theory across different forms of coercive 
force and diplomacy in which a nation engages.  The goal was to develop a 
theory with enough flexibility to provide a common approach for dealing with 
the vast uncertainty sure to be presented by Information Age threat.  
The first two chapters argued for Stimulus Based Discovery as a tool to 
counter a broader threat spectrum with America’s advantages in range and 
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accuracy.  The nature of future conflict will demand military forces that can hunt 
down and find network adversaries on a global battlefield densely populated 
with non-combatants, and independent range and accuracy provide the 
firepower to deal with those threats once located.  However, the task of 
discriminating threats from neutrals is quite challenging.  In response to this 
problem, the authors look to network science that shows all organizations grown 
over time with preferential attachment form scale-free networks.  These 
networks are both simultaneously fault-tolerant and susceptible to attack if hubs 
can be identified.  Therefore, the authors demonstrate that Stimulus Based 
Discovery will reveal the location of networks hubs faster and more accurately 
than passive standoff observation.  Furthermore, a passive approach is 
reminiscent of law enforcement tactics and fails to take advantages of time-tested 
principles of war available to military forces.   
Redefining attack in this context means stimulating networks through one 
of four tactics to learn where hubs are located and then taking the offensive 
against those hubs.  Taking the basic considerations of network adversaries, with 
special emphasis on terror networks, the authors next build a model of network 
development.  This network model self-organizes into a scale-free system as 
predicted by Barabosi and is an ideal laboratory for putting the theory of 
Stimulus Based Discovery to the test. 
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IV. IMPLEMENTING A LABORATORY FOR RESEARCHING 
STIMULUS BASED DISCOVERY 
A. INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH 
During the scoping of the problem of representing the story of terrorist 
agents planning, preparing, and executing terrorist missions, the authors 
examined the recent thesis dissertation work of Brian Osborn on the Story 
Engine.  The Story Engine provides a framework for creating interactive stories 
that have multiple pathways and non-deterministic endings (Osborn 2002).  The 
original thoughts with regards to targeting terrorist networks were to describe 
the desired end state as the ending scene in a story, determine what the possible 
scenes throughout the story were and what the starting scene was, and then 
create the ability to create a story line backwards from the desired end state to 
the starting scene.  In creating this backwards story line, if a scene had multiple 
scenes that could follow that scene, the scene would be considered a hub in the 
story line graph.  These hubs would become the focus point for concentrating on 
driving the story line to the desired ending or endings. 
Several major issues prevented the authors from effectively using the 
Story Engine and drove them to a more basic approach.  First, by using the Story 
Engine, the authors would have to determine all of the discreet story scenes for 
the entire story line, a daunting proposition at best, given that life itself is not 
defined by discreet, repeatable events, or scenes in one’s own life’s story.  
Second, the Story Engine was designed for user interaction around a single user 
character, when what the authors wanted to describe and model was a whole 
organization of main characters, with their own life cycles, or story lines.  Lastly, 
after reading Barabasi’s work on networks, it became clear that to model a 
complex adaptive organization such as a terrorist organization, then software 
designed for complex interactions would need to be used, which drove the 
authors towards a Multi-Agent System design. 
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B. MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS 
1. Introduction 
A Multi-Agent System (MAS) are systems of multiple entities, known as 
agents, which interact with each other (Woolridge, 2002, p. xi).  Agents are 
autonomous entities that act on its own behalf or on the behalf of its owner to 
accomplish its own goals and objectives.  Agents exist in some environment, 
which they can sense, use that information to make some decision, and then take 
some actions within that environment. (Woolridge, 2002, p. 15).  While an agent 
could be a simple control program, the type of agent used in MASs is an 
intelligent agent.  Intelligent agents generally fall into one of three categories: 
reactive, proactive, and social.  Reactive agents simple take actions in direct 
response to their perception of the environment.  Proactive agents have some 
form of goal-orientation that drives their interaction with the environment.  
Lastly, social agents are able to interact with other agents and even humans to 
accomplish their goals and objectives.  Multi-Agent Systems typically deal with 
this third type of agents, those that interact with each other (Woolridge, 2002, p. 
23). 
Experts describe terrorist organizations as complex, highly interconnected 
yet cellular networks of operatives.  The high degree of interconnectivity among 
the members of the organization and the counter-intuitive macro-behaviors of 
the system as a whole that result from decisions at the individual level accurately 
characterize the complexity of these systems.  As a parallel to complex adaptive 
organizations, software engineers have highlighted the now widely known 
truism that interaction between software components drives the definition of 
complex software.  Multi-Agent Systems of social agents then become an 
effective approach to modeling these complex interactions between entities in the 
system (Woolridge, 2002, pp. 226-7].  Trying to understand a complex adaptive 
system, a top-down reductionism approach gives rise to uncertainty about how 
to design the expected macro-behaviors.  As such, MASs are designed from the 
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bottom-up, relying on the micro-decisions of the agents drive the evolving 
macro-behavior of the system.  Jacques Ferber created a design methodology for 
creating MASs (Ferber 1999).  In his design methodology, a MAS is described by 
the components Environment, Objects, Agents, Relationships, Operations, and 
Laws.  The notation shown in Figure 5 summarizes Ferber’s design 
methodology. 
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Figure 5.   Multi-Agent System Design Framework. 
 
The next sections describe how Ferber’s methodology was applied to the 
design of the hypothetical terrorist network.  Additional concepts of 
incorporating procedural knowledge, known as tickets and frames, as well as a 
means for agents to communicate with each other, known as connectors, are 
introduced. 
2. Environment 
In a MAS, the environment describes the physical or logical space that the 
agents live in.  In choosing the scope of the environment, the designer must 
consider what the level of detail for the model is.  The environment defines the 
boundaries of the system.  In the Terrorist Network Simulation (TNS), the 
environment is the logical space of the terrorist agents and the connections and 
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communications with each other.  No physical environment is modeled in this 
simulation. 
3. Objects 
The objects in the environment are the things that interact and can be 
interacted upon.  To determine the objects, the designer uses a method found in 
object-oriented design.  The designer performs a lexical parse of the problem 
statement to find the nouns in the problem statement.  From that set of words the 
objects in the environment are determined.  Those objects included in the design 
are those relevant to level of detail defined in the environment.  In the TNS, the 
only objects in the system are the agents themselves, which are described below. 
4. Agents 
Agent in a MAS are the active objects.  They are the objects that can sense 
the environment, make some decision based on that sensory input and a decision 
structure, and finally take some action within the environment.  Each agent 
maintains some representation of the environment, also known as the external 
environment to the agent.  The representation kept by the agent is known as the 
agent’s internal environment.  The internal environment provides a 
representation of the agent’s state.  Each agent has attributes that define the 
agent’s behavior.  In the TNS, each agent is a terrorist agent whose attributes are 
its personality, roles, goals, sensors, and mental map.  Each of these attributes as 
well as the agents themselves is described in further detail below. 
5. Relationships 
In Ferber’s MAS design methodology, relationships are the interactions 
that take place between and among objects and the environment.  Agents interact 
with objects, the environment, and with each other.  Objects can interact with 
each other and the environment as well.  Each relationship describes the rules for 
forming relationships, the allowable actions within the relationship, and the rules 
for dissolving relationships.  In the TNS, relationships play a key role for 
allowing agents to communicate with each other.  The relationships are classified 
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into two general types of communications: requests and commands.  
Relationships are expounded upon further below. 
6. Operations 
MAS operations define the system-level processes and procedures that 
take place.  The operations describe the objects and agents involved in the 
process and how the operations are encoded in the system design.  The TNS 
models the process of terrorists progressing from individuals contacted by 
recruiters to join the organization, turning into recruits and operatives, and then 
planning, rehearsing, and executing terrorist missions.  The majority of the 
operations in the TNS are captured in the relationships between the agents 
through an adaptation of the RELATE architecture created by Kim Roddy and 
Michael Dickson (Roddy and Dickson, 2000).  These operations are operator 
recruiting, recruiter recruiting, trainer recruiting, recruit training, organizing a 
mission cell, cell operations, and resource bartering. 
7. Laws 
Laws describe the limits of the MAS.  Laws might include the laws of 
physics such as gravity, or spatial and temporal constraints.  Laws are inviolate 
rules that the agents must live by.  Since the TNS has no physical environment, 
no physical laws are needed, but since the simulation model terrorist agent 
actions that take place over time, some limit is placed on how much an agent can 
accomplish in any given time period.  The TNS is turn-based, so each agent can 
only act upon one goal in each turn. 
8. Connectors 
Connectors allow one type of interaction between agents.  Connectors 
follow a biological metaphor of proteins interacting with a cell that was 
developed by John Hiles of the MOVES Institute at the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) (Hiles et. al., 2002).  His work has been implemented in Brian 
Osborn’s Story Engine (Osborn, 2002, p. 55).  Connectors are described by their 
type and their state of being extended or retracted.  Connector types are 
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receptors and stimulators.  When a receptor connector is in an extended state, it 
can connect with a stimulator that is also in an extended state.  When the 
connectors connect, then several actions take place within each agent based on 
the type of connection made.  Actions that take place include the exchange of 
information, the issuing of actions or orders for the other agent to carry out, or 
the transformation of one or both of the agents into another state or type.  These 
actions are carried out in the form of procedural knowledge known as tickets. 
9. Tickets 
Tickets encapsulate the procedural knowledge that an agent has.  This 
idea again was developed by John Hiles while at the MOVES Institute.  The 
concept of tickets is explained in greater detail in Brian Osborn’s dissertation 
work on the Story Engine (Osborn, 2002, pp. 68-71), so only a brief description of 
their functionality is included here.  Tickets incorporate atomic actions an agent 
can take, typically in a sequential manner.  Tickets are not limited to sequential 
actions; however, those used in the TNS are all sequential in nature.  Tickets are 
designed to either complete each intended action, or to have those actions 
interrupted through interaction with other agents.  The TNS incorporates tickets 
of both types.  Each ticket consists of one or more frames, each of which is an 
atomic action the agent can perform. 
10. Frames 
A frame in a ticket encapsulates an atomic action, another component of 
John Hiles’ framework for giving agents procedural knowledge (Hiles at. al., 
2002).  Frames consist of either of an action, a connector, or another ticket.  
Actions encapsulate reusable functions performed by the agents such that ticket 
composition is accomplished by selecting the associated actions into the desired 
order necessary to accomplish some procedure or process.  Connectors are 
included in a frame so that their state can be changed and connections can be 
made with other agents.  The TNS makes extensive use of tickets, frames, actions, 
and connectors and each are described in further detail below. 
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C. NETWORK CONCEPTS 
The TNS incorporates the key characteristics of scale-free networks in its 
design. 
1. Growth 
Growth in the network is accomplished through a discreet event 
simulation that introduces new agents in an arrival process, which is discussed 
in detail below. 
2. Preferential Attachment 
To create preferential attachment in the network, the authors used the 
idea that agents when given a choice would connect to the agent that was most 
influential, those agents that had “high fitness” (Barabasi, 2002, p. 96]. 
3. Rich-Get-Richer 
The TNS incorporates the rich-get-richer phenomenon by rewarding the 
agents for actions they take and goals they complete.  The amount of reward is 
proportional to some characteristic of the agent’s personality, so that the higher 
the characteristic, the higher the reward.  This reward scheme creates a non-
linear growth in the agent’s overall worth in the system.  In the TNS, those 
agents who are the most influential become the rich and therefore garner more 
resources and create missions that other terrorists desire to join.  The simulation 
makes the assumption that agents do not become jaded or discouraged by their 
experiences, thus turning down missions, but instead they always prefer to join 
missions with a higher level of fitness.  Modeling the effect of bad experiences by 
the agents is left for future work. 
D. MODEL DESCRIPTION 
The Terrorist Network Simulation brings together a wide array of 
concepts to produce a dynamic complex adaptive system that mimics a plausible 
terrorist organization.  The simulation incorporates Barabasi’s ideas on scale-free 
networks and weaves those ideas into the individual agents and their 
interactions with each other.  The simulation is designed from the bottom-up, so 
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no global control is placed on how the network forms.  The TNS borrows the 
concepts generated in the RELATE architecture and then modifies the way 
relationships are managed between agents for a networked environment.  The 
authors borrow and extend on John Hiles’ concepts of tickets, frames, and 
connectors in a network environment on Project IAGO (Intelligent Asymmetric 
Goal Organization) and these concepts are used extensively for creating the 
actions and interactions of the agents (Hiles and Lewis, 2002 and Hiles, 2003). 
1. Adapting the RELATE Architecture 
To create a network simulating individual terrorist agents, these agents 
needed to interact with each other heavily for the express purpose of 
accomplishing missions set forth by the leaders of the organization.  Kim Roddy 
and Mike Dickson of the Naval Postgraduate School created the RELATE 
architecture in 2000 expressly for facilitating the development of applications 
that relied on relationships and interactions between autonomous agents.  The 
RELATE (Relationships, Environment, Laws, Agents, Things, and Effectors) 
architecture provided a base set of Java classes to develop a relation-centric 
program.  The architecture provided the majority of what was needed to create 
the model of a terrorist organization.  Most of the interfaces were extended to 
add Java methods particular to the TNS, such as TNSGoal extending the 
RELATE interface Goal.  Each of the goal objects in the TNS then implemented 
the TNSGoal interface, gaining methods from the superclass and the TNS 
subclass.  These extensions of the RELATE architecture allowed for casting of 
RELATE objects to TNS objects to use the additional functionality in the TNS.  A 
few exceptions are noteworthy in the extension and implementation of the 
RELATE architecture.  Several of the instance variables of the Agent class were 
initially declared private, and in the TNS implementation they were changed 
to protected to allow for easier access to those variables by the 
TerroristAgent class that extended Agent.  The other noteworthy exception 
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was the nearly complete re-write of the other concrete class in the RELATE 
architecture, the RelationshipManager. 
In the RELATE architecture, agents could only exist in one instance of any 
given relationship type.  For instance, in Roddy and Dickson’s thesis, they 
created a replication of Andy Ilachinsky’s ISAAC (Irreducible Semi-Autonomous 
Adaptive Combat) framework (Ilachinsky 1997), called JACOB that simulates 
land combat.  In this scenario, an agent can belong to a squad, company, and 
army, and only one of each of these organizational groupings.  This paradigm 
worked fine for JACOB and other simulations that used the relationships to 
categorize levels of organizational affiliation.  In the TNS, relationships 
precipitated the formation of the Observer, or Publish-Subscribe pattern, which 
relied on the listener model paradigm to register and de-register listeners of 
connectors.  In the listener model, the only entities that should hear an 
announcement from another entity are that entity’s listeners.  So in the 
development of the TNS, the authors came across the scenario where the 
management of the listener model and the current implementation of the 
RelationshipManager were at odds with each other.  In the RELATE 
architecture, determination if the conditions had been met for a relationship to 
form was delegated to the individual Relationship objects.  In determining if 
a given Agent could form a relationship, the individual Relationship objects 
looked at which agents that particular Agent object in question knew about 
through its sensors and then examined if the conditions were met for creating a 
single relationship object for all qualifying agents to be added to. 
A similar mechanism was used when adding an Agent to an existing 
Relationship object.  The problem for the TNS arose when the individual 
Relationship objects needed to determine those agents that should belong to 
the relationship and therefore become a registered listener or broadcaster.  The 
solution was to only allow relationships between agents that were maximally 
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connected to each other in the network.  If agents were directly linked to each 
other in the network, then they knew about each other, and since they knew 
about each other, they had to potential to hear one another’s connectors. 
As a result, the ConditionsMet method of the Relationship interface 
was abandoned and the RelationshipManager was modified to check for 
maximally connected relationships between agents.  Each turn of the simulation 
each agent would check if any new relationships should be created with the 
other agents it knew.  If any two agents should belong in a relationship, then the 
agent whose turn it was would check to see if it had a Relationship object of 
that type.  If it did, then it checked to see if the Agent in question was in one of 
those relationships, and if not, to check if that Agent would be maximally 
connected to a relationship if it was added.  If it would be maximally connected 
to the agents in the relationship, then the agent was added.  If it could be 
maximally connected to any of the relationships, then a new one was formed and 
the two Agents were added to the relationship.  If the agent checking 
relationships did not have a Relationship object of the particular type, then it 
checked with the Agent in question to see if it had one.  If it did, then the Agent 
checking relationship tried to see if it would be maximally connected with the 
other Agent’s relationships and added itself if it was.  If neither Agent had a 
Relationship object of the particular type in question, then a new was 
dynamically created using Java’s capabilities of reflection and the two agents 
were added to the relationship. 
A similar issue arose when the authors needed to remove agents from 
relationships.  The structure proposed in the Relationship objects as 
evidenced by the work on JACOB did not satisfactorily destroy the right agents 
from the right Relationship objects, so the authors returned to the principle of 
maximal connectedness with the added idea of keeping track of which types of 
agents could belong to which relationship types.  Each turn an agent would 
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determine if the relationships it was in were “appropriate,” in other words, did 
the relationship have at least one other agent in it that was an allowable type, 
and were all the agents in the relationship of the allowable types.  If neither 
query proved true, then that agent removed itself from the relationship and the 
last agent to delete itself from a relationship destroyed the Relationship object 
and updated the master list of Relationships being maintained by the 
RelationshipManager. 
The last modification to the core RELATE architecture was to allow agents 
to keep a list of the individual Relationship objects for each relationship type.  
In the original RELATE architecture, each agent could only have one 
Relationship object of any given type, so this functionality needed to be 
added to the RelationshipManager and all associated classes that accessed an 
agent’s collection of Relationship objects.  With the modified RELATE 
architecture at the core of the TNS operation, the individual agents could 
successfully interact with each other to accomplish their objectives. 
2. Terrorist Agents 
Terrorist agents are the key components of the TNS.  Each agent 
represents an individual that takes on different roles in the organization and has 
particular goals related to those roles.  Some of the roles carry with them 
particular needs and capabilities, but the majority of the functionality remained 
the same across roles.  Each agent can take on more than one role and the 
authors’ implementation reflects this fact for the most part, but this initial 
implementation did not attempt to allow agents this ability for the simplicity of 
code creation.  Instances where future work is needed to finish this development 
are noted below.  Each agent has its own personality to set it apart from other 
agents and to affect its interactions with other agents in the simulation.  The last 
key component to the terrorist agents is the agent’s mental map.  Figure 6 below 




Figure 6.   Terrorist Agent Software Components. 
 
a. Roles 
Roles represent an array of character types, such as individuals 
looking for a cause to join, influential individuals in the community seeking out 
those types, specialists in the various tools of the terrorist trade, experienced 
operators with the nuts-and-bolts knowledge of running operations waiting to 
pass on their knowledge and wisdom, to experienced and influential 
masterminds dreaming up a wide range of devious plots to inflict upon the 
civilized world.  Each role carries with it a set of goals specific to that role and 
these will be expounded upon below.   
b. Goals 
A goal is an objective the agent seeks to accomplish.  For some of 
the roles, these goals are checked off as they are completed so that the agent may 
change role types or to track the agent’s status on the progression toward a larger 
goal such as carrying out a mission.  Each agent has a variable goal apparatus 
that allows that agent to act upon the most important goal at any turn in the 
simulation.  Each goal is associated with a particular behavior the designer 
desires the agent to exhibit.  Each goal has a means to score it against its other 
goals and therefore select the highest weighted goal, hence the term “variable” 
used in describing the goal apparatus.  Lastly each goal has an associated set of 
actions the agent can take to accomplish the goal.  In the TNS, each goal uses a 
Ticket with associated Actions to accomplish the goals. 
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c. Personality 
With the agent’s role or roles, the personality gives each agent a 
distinct character.  In the RELATE architecture, each personality is unique to the 
specific application, and in the TNS, each agent has personality traits of 
allegiance, experience, and influence. 
(1) Allegiance.  An agent’s allegiance value models the 
agent’s dedication to the organization.  Agents with higher allegiance are more 
likely to perform certain actions out of their devotion to the organization.  For 
young contacts and recruits, the agent’s allegiance determines how much time a 
recruiter has to spend with that agent testing the agent’s mettle for joining the 
organization. 
(2) Experience.  The agent’s Experience value models 
how skilled the agent is in conducting terrorist-related activities.  For specialists, 
such as arms dealers, financiers, and logisticians, the experience value 
determines the departure point for how much of a resource the agent can 
produce in a given turn.  For leaders, the experience value helps determine how 
attractive of a mission the leader can devise and what the resources will be 
needed for the operation.  Experienced agents can create more elaborate, more 
seductive missions due to their experience and influence, and therefore draw 
more agents to join on the lucrative missions. 
(3) Influence.  The agent’s influence value is the ultimate 
determination of where the agent falls in the organization’s pecking order.  
Influence combines with experience for leaders creating missions.  Influence is 
also used to determine whether or not an agent is willing to communication with 
another agent or is willing to pass on a message coming from another agent.  
Influence and experience also combine together in the specialists to create the 
notion of status with respect to answer a leader’s request for the specialist to 
provide a resource.  For instance, if the leader’s mission is below the stature of 
the specialist, then the specialist will ignore the leader’s request. 
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d. Sensors 
Each role also includes zero or more sensors that can detect other 
agents of a given type of role as explained below.  The sensors are simple cookie-
cutter type sensors that use the locations of the agents in the logical space to 
determine if detection takes place. 
e. Mental Map 
The mental map is the agent’s mental space of how it perceives the 
network environment based on whom that agent knows directly and indirectly 
knows about (Fauconnier, 2002, 102).  A mental map is the agent’s own 
worldview.  The agent evaluates its goals and acts upon them largely based on 
the agent’s mental map.  An agent’s mental map likely differs from the explicit 
map of the network, or the ground truth of who knows whom in the 
organization. 
f. Sub-Network 
To complement the mental map, a helper class known as the 
SubNet, or sub-network, kept track of the edges or links within the individual 
agent’s mental map of the network.  Where the mental map tracks exactly who 
the agent knows and knows about indirectly, the mental map delegates the task 
of tracking which agents know which other agents in the mental map.  The sub-
network accomplishes this task using another helper class called an AgentPair.  
A pair is simply a class the captures the fact that two agents are linked to each 
other and therefore know each other.  The sub-work only contains unique pairs, 
so both agent pairs {A, B} and {B, A} would not exist in the sub-network, but 
instead just one would.  Agent pairs also have one other characteristic, a history 
value. 
The purpose of the history value is to place a value on the 
relationship a pair of agents have had.  Any time two agents interact with each 
other, the history value between the two agents is incremented, attempting to 
provide some notion that strong relationships develop over time through 
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interaction between two people.  Each turn, the history values on all of the agent 
pairs in the simulation are decremented by one.  When the history value of a 
given pair falls below zero (the initial value is some non-zero value), then the 
relationship has drifted apart and the link between the two agents is broken, 
both explicitly within the network, but also with both agents’ mental maps.  This 
feature models the fact that people eventually drift apart if they do not interact or 
communicate with each other.  While the rate at which people drift apart is based 
on individual differences, this model provides a generic approach that 
approximates the desired behavior.  In the TNS, operators who have been 
conducting mission with leaders and not interacting with the recruiter who 
initially convinced them to join the organization, the relational link between the 
operator and the recruiter eventually breaks.  With this effect in the network 
model, the emerging networks more appropriately resemble plausible scale-free 
terrorist networks.  The sub-network also becomes a useful tool for graphically 
rendering a representation of the network. 
g. Life-Cycle 
Most agents start out their life in the simulation as a contact, the 
disgruntled youth mentioned above.  Along comes a recruiter, such as a mullah 
running a madrassa in the Arab world or a bar tender in Ireland looking for IRA 
recruits.  The recruiter attempts to entice the contact to join the organization and 
if the contact does, he become a recruit.  A recruit’s objective in life is to become a 
full-fledged operator and carry out terrorist missions.  Before a recruit can reach 
that state in life, the recruiter needs to check out the recruit for his 
trustworthiness to join the organization.  The recruiter will take a small number 
of recruits out and perform a small mission, such as maybe knocking over a 
convenience store to determine if the recruits have what it takes to earn a place 
within the organization.  Once the recruits are deemed worthy, the recruiter sets 
them up with a trainer to get them up to the minimum level of proficiency 
necessary to carry out missions. 
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Once the recruit has been trained, he becomes an operator.  From 
this point, his world opens up as to his possibilities for make a name for himself 
in the organization.  The first goal for an operator is to get in touch with a leader 
who needs muscle for pulling jobs.  The operator can find leaders either through 
the trainer who just trained him acting as a proxy, or by putting his feelers out 
through the organization, by basically asking around.  Once an operator has 
found a leader to join, he becomes part of the leader’s terrorist cell.  Operators 
rehearse and execute missions gaining experience and/or influence after each 
mission.  Operators generally have good working knowledge and therefore can 
advance into trainers to pass their wisdom down should the conditions exist for 
the operator to do so. 
Leaders can promote operators though when the situation arises 
that the leader needs a particular resource such as money and the leader doesn’t 
know a financier to provide him this critical component.  The leader orders an 
operator to become a financier, a small-time one at best, but the newly appointed 
financier starts gathering resources for the leader.  Specialists, such as the arms 
dealer, financier, and logistician, have usually gained some status in the 
organization, and may decide to become their own leader should they get bored 
or ignored by the other leaders in the system.  Additionally, if a specialist 
becomes disavowed from the organization due to lack of contact with other 
agents, then the specialist will advance himself to a leader to create his own 
splinter cell.  Agents do not promote or advance into recruiters, as they are 
influential types with local knowledge recruited by leaders to feed the 
organization new blood.  As such, recruiters are introduced into the system on 
their own.  For a contact to climb up the organizational ladder to hopefully 




3. Targets and Missions 
Targets and missions form the core objective for the organization as 
a whole, even though leaders own the targets and missions and shepherd them 
through to completion.  Targets specify the requirements for mission 
accomplishment, such as how many resources are needed and how long the 
operatives will need to rehearse and execute the mission to bring it to 
completion.  Missions keep track of the current status of accomplishing an attack 
on a target, therefore missions hold the status of the different levels of resources, 
how many and which operators have joined the mission, and how many turns 
the cell has rehearsed or executed the mission.  Each target has characteristics of 
impact, stability, and draw. 
a. Target Impact 
The target impact models the relative worth of the target.  The 
bombing of the World Trade Center buildings was a target of high impact, an 
event that shook the world.  The shooting of several American soldiers outside 
Camp Doha in Kuwait was a low impact target, noteworthy, but in the large 
scheme of effecting a nation, a small event. 
b. Target Stability 
Target stability models the window of opportunity when the target 
is vulnerable to attack.  The World Trade Center buildings were rock-solid stable 
targets; they were not moving.  However, the gassing of thousands of spectators 
at the Super Bowl would constitute a low stability target, where the window of 
opportunity consisted of a matter of hours. 
c. Target Draw 
Target draw represents the overall relative value of a mission 
compared to other missions.  Targets with higher draw create missions that are 
more desirable to participate in them because of the potential for fame, glory, 
and perceived reward in the afterlife.  Target draw consisted of the product of 
impact and the base 2 logarithm of stability, as shown in Figure 7. 
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2= logDraw Impact Stabilityi  
Figure 7.   Target Draw. 
 
The logarithm in the draw equation puts emphasis on the impact 
value so that given two targets, one with high impact and low stability and 
another with low impact and high stability, those two targets are not on the same 
scale, but instead the target with the high impact and low stability has a higher 
draw. 
d. Mission Requirements 
The draw of the mission seeds a random number generator for 
deriving the mission requirements in terms of operators, resources, and time.  
The seed for the operator requirement is the base 2 logarithm of the draw, which 
is plugged into a triangle probability distribution as the mean and the maximum.  
Figure 8 shows a triangle distribution’s probability distribution function.  The 
distribution is defined by a minimum, a, a maximum b, and a mean, c.  The TNS 
typically used right triangles for the distributions as seen on the right side of 
Figure 8.  For code development, the authors found it easier to use right triangles 
versus keeping track of some global maximum, b, as seen on the left, that always 






Figure 8.   Triangle Distribution. 
 
For the remainder of the resources, the mean and maximum were 
determined by the square root of the target’s draw.  These seeds produced 
a c b a b, c 
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reasonable levels of required resources relative to other missions of higher and 
lower draw. 
4. Roles 
An Agent can take on one or more roles throughout its life cycle as 
mentioned above.  These roles represent positions within the organization the 
agent takes on to further their own personal goals and those of the organization.  
Each role brings with it a set of associated goals that help define the behaviors 
the agents exhibit as described above in the variable goal apparatus.  Figure 9 
below shows the relationship between the roles, relationships, goals, and 
connectors in the TNS model.  The arrows pointing to and from the connectors 
show the relationship between the stimulators and receptors.  Stimulators have 











The contact role represents those individual who are sought out by 
recruiters looking for potential supporters of the organizations cause.  Contacts 
exist in the scenario for a particular period of time in which they may be 
contacted by a recruiter.  At the time of contact, the contact decides whether or 
not to join the organization.  If the contact does decide to join the organization, 
he will turn into a recruit. 
b. Recruit 
A recruit represents a greenhorn in the organization.  Recruits join 
the organization with a given level of allegiance and if that level is not high 
enough for the recruiter, then the recruiter will take that recruit out on a mini-
mission to let him prove his worth, possibly with other recruits.  Once a recruit 
has been “proven,” then the recruiter sends him off to a trainer to be turned into 
an operator. 
c. Operator 
Operators are the workhorses of the organization, providing the 
muscle and manpower to accomplish a leader’s mission.  Operators have the 
potential to advance up in the organization, either through a type of self-
promotion or through a leader-directed promotion. 
d. Recruiter 
Recruiters represent locally influential and well-connected 
individuals who know where to look to find potentially lucrative contacts that 
might want to join the organization.  Recruiters aren’t typically experienced, as 
they don’t participate in the day-to-day operations of the organization, but focus 
instead on pumping in new blood to the organization.  Leaders seek recruiters 
out so that those leaders can meet their requirements for operators in a mission.  





Trainers model those individuals in the organization who are good 
at what they do as far as the ins and outs of mission operations.  As such, these 
trainers are ideal for passing that knowledge down to young recruits.  Trainers 
are like career Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) in militaries today, people 
who’ve “been around the block” and are looking to share that wisdom with raw 
recruits.  Trainers also sit at the top of one track of advancement for individuals 
in the organization.  Those individuals who either do not become promoted by a 
leader to a specialist role and continue to gain experience and influence through 
carrying out missions, or become disavowed by the organization, convert into 
trainers and do not advance to any other role beyond the trainer. 
f. Financier 
The first of three specialist roles, the financier provides the ever-
essential component for any operation, money.  In the specialist roles, the agent’s 
experience drives their ability to produce their particular resource and their 
influence controls how much resource; therefore specialists represent a range of 
individuals in this class.  Financiers with a low experience and influence model 
individuals only capable of knocking over some convenience stores or 
conducting credit card fraud to grab a relatively small amount of money.  
Experienced and influential financiers on the hand are like bankers who know 
how to move large amounts of money discreetly, or oil sheiks who want to 
support the organization while at the same time appearing impartial, or 
individuals with “old money” that donate to the cause. 
g. Logistician 
The second of the specialist roles, the logistician provides the 
organization the ways and means necessary to carry out mission.  Logisticians 
provide among other things, transportation such as vehicles and planes, obtain 
passports and the like, coordinate safe-houses, and setup communications such 
as obtaining encrypted satellite phones.  Inexperienced logisticians probably 
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make fake passports out of their own house, hotwire cars for transportation, and 
buy cell phones from a local retailer, while their more experience brethren know 
whom to call to forge a visa, how to obtain stolen cars with fake license plates, 
and how to sanitize and fence stolen goods for the organization, while the really 
influential types have access to large-scale commercial and military 
transportation to include ocean-going vessels and might even own a 
transportation company or an import/export company, or maybe even work in a 
consulate or passport office (or at least know someone who does and is willing to 
help out). 
h. Arms Dealer 
The last of the specialists, arms dealers, provide the instruments of 
terror that mark the unconventional and often shocking methods these 
organizations employ.  Bit player arms dealers might rob a gun store or make a 
fertilizer bomb from something they read off the Internet while real players in 
the arms market know how to obtain untraceable small arms, quality explosives, 
and possibly weapons of mass effects, such as “dirty” bombs or even quite 
possibly nuclear weapons, biological pathogens such as anthrax or small pox, or 
chemical toxins such as Sarin gas. 
i. Leader 
The leader role models the masterminds of some of the most 
despicable acts inflicted upon humankind.  Leaders devise targets and lead the 
rehearsal and execution of missions.  Leaders handle the gathering of resources 
from specialists to meet the target requirements and work with trainers and 
recruiters for their manpower requirements.  The TNS allows leaders to grow 
from small-time thugs to the kingpins of large criminal and terrorist 
organizations.  As each leader successfully completes a mission, he becomes 
more experienced and more influential, raising his stature in the organization 
over time, and therefore becoming capable of pulling off acts of terrorism that 
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reach the front pages of newspapers worldwide.  For these leaders to accomplish 
all of these goals, they need to establish relationships. 
5. Relationships 
Relationships define the various associations the agents have with each 
other and frame the reasons for why they communicate with each other.  
Relationships allow for agents to accomplish goals that would not otherwise be 
accomplishable without the existence of relationships (Roddy, 2002, p. 38).  Each 
role gives each agent a local set of skills they can bring to the organization, but 
one individual cannot do it all, so they have to collaborate with each other. 
a. Managing Relationships 
Each agent manages his own relationships through the 
RelationshipManager as mentioned above.  Each turn the agent checks to 
determine which relationships it should belong in, create, or get out of.  The 
functionality for determining if the conditions are met for forming a relationship 
in the TNS have been exported to the RelationshipManager vice in the 
individual Relationship objects since the requirements were the same for each 
Relationship object, that of maximum connectedness.  This maximum 
connectedness facilitates the registering and de-registering of listeners for 
connectors.  The rest of this section expounds upon each of the relationship types 
in the TNS. 
b. Operator Recruiting 
Contacts and recruiters participate in the operator recruiting 
relationship for the sole purpose of allowing recruiters the ability to entice those 
individuals in the population most likely to support the organization’s cause. 
c. Recruit Training 
Once contacts join the organization and become recruits, they enter 
into a recruit training relationship with the recruiter who just recruited them.  
When the recruiter introduces the recruits to a trainer, they can also enter into a 
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relationship with the trainer as well so that they can receive training and become 
full-fledged operators. 
d. Organizing a Mission Cell 
Mission cell organization is handled by a three-way relationship 
between trainers, operators, and leaders.  Once a recruit has become skilled 
enough according to a trainer, then he becomes and operator and looks to join a 
leader on a mission.  Operators can either come in contact with a leader by being 
introduced to a leader via a trainer who knows one, or by asking around the 
organization for leaders who need operators and receiving a response from one 
of those leaders. 
e. Cell Operations 
Once an operator is in a cell, he participates in a cell operations 
relationship with that leader.  This relationship facilitates the leader’s ability to 
rehearse and execute his mission with the members of his cell.  It also allows 
leaders to spot promote operators to specialists when the need arises. 
f. Financial Bartering 
The leader participates in five other binary relationships with 
members in the organization in order to accumulate the necessary resources and 
manpower for carrying out missions.  The first of these relationships is the 
financial bartering relationship with financiers.  This relationship allows the 
leader to request and receive money and other financial aid from the financier. 
g. Logistics Bartering 
The leader and logistician roles participate in the logistics bartering 
relationships for the sole purpose of exchanging logistical resources at the 
leader’s request. 
h. Arms Bartering 
Leaders and arms dealers share the arms bartering relationship so 
that the leader can gather the necessary instruments of terror for the mission at 
hand. 
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i. Recruiter Recruiting 
Leaders and recruiters share a relationship when leaders sense 
other recruiters in the environment that are not directly linked to the leader.  This 
relationship models the fact that leaders seek out locally knowledgeable, 
influential, and willing individuals who can assist the leader in adding numbers 
to the organization’s roster.  Without operators in the organization, the 
organization cannot grow, so recruiters perform half of the critical role of feeding 
these individuals to the leaders. 
j. Trainer Recruiting 
Leaders and trainers join into a similar relationship as that between 
leaders and recruiters to fill the other half of the critical role of keeping the 
organization manned.  This relationship allows leaders to seek out those 
individuals who can provide them with skilled people he needs to pull off 
missions. 
6. Goals 
All actions by agents are motivated towards goal.  As mentioned above, 
each role carries with it certain goals that are also related to the relationships that 
that role type can join into.  These goals also allow the agents to fulfill their part 
of a contract between the other members of the relationship for completing 
organizational goals. 
a. Contact Goals 
(1) Make Contact.  Any contact that appears in the 
simulation starts off with this goal as the primary goal until they have been 
successfully contacted and recruited.  This goal encodes the behavior of a contact 
being open for communication from a recruiter.  Whether or not the contact 
actually joins the organization is another story; this goal simply facilitates that 
process.  This goal also creates the behavior that the contact only gets one chance 
to join the organization.  If the contact chooses not to join, then he will disappear 
from the simulation. 
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(2) Become a Recruit.  This goal models the contact’s 
official passage from being just a contact to actually getting his foot in the door as 
a recruit.   
b. Recruit Goals 
(1) Prove Allegiance.  The recruit training relationship 
defines a threshold that a recruit’s allegiance value must exceed before they can 
proceed onto training.  This goal represents the recruit’s desire to become 
initiated into the organization, to prove their worth so they can move on to being 
an operator. 
(2) Get Trained.  Once a recruit has been initiated or is 
trustworthy enough not to need initiation, the recruit needs to meet a trainer so 
that he can gain some base-level experience before joining a cell and participating 
in missions.  This goal creates the behavior of a recruiter introducing the recruit 
to a trainer for that purpose. 
(3) Become an Operator.  This goal creates the behavior 
of the recruiter training with the trainer to become an operator.  When the trainer 
has deemed the recruit has had enough training, the recruit becomes an operator. 
c. Operator Goals 
(1) Join a Leader on a Mission.  The first priority of an 
operator is to get into a cell.  This goal creates the behavior of an operator 
looking for that opportunity.  The operator can either go through the trainer or 
ask around the organization to accomplish this goal. 
(2) Rehearse a Mission.  Once an operator has received a 
target as part of joining a leader in a cell on a mission and the leader has decided 
the mission needs to be rehearsed, this goal allows the operator to exhibit the 
behavior of the agent secluding himself with the rest of his cell to practice the 
upcoming mission. 
(3) Execute a Mission.  Once the leader has decided that 
mission is ready to be executed, this goal gives the operator the behavior of 
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participating in the mission for a period of time as specified by the leader’s 
requirements. 
(4) Advance to a Trainer.  If the agent becomes bored or 
disavowed because he has not participated in a mission for a given length of 
time, this goal gives him the behavior to possibly advance to the trainer role. 
d. Recruiter Goals 
(1) Find Contacts.  One of the primary behaviors a recruit 
exhibits is that of find new contacts for the organization.  This goal gives the 
recruiter that ability by having him attempt to contact and woo any contacts he 
can find. 
(2) Verify Recruits’ Allegiance.  Another function the 
recruiter performs is initiating new recruits, testing them to see if they are willing 
and ready to commit to the organization.  This goal provides recruiters with the 
behavior to increase the allegiance of new recruits before he sends them off to 
become trained. 
(3) Send Recruits to Training.  The last duty a recruiter 
performs is to put recruits in contact with a trainer so that they may go off to a 
training camp and train up to become operators.  This goal gives the recruiter the 
behavior of either introducing recruits to a known trainer, or putting out his 
feelers throughout the organization to find a trainer willing to take the new 
recruits.  When sending the recruits to a known trainer, the recruiter exhibits the 
behavior of passing the recruits to the most influential trainer the recruiter 
knows at the time, helping to induce the rich-get-richer phenomenon in the 
system. 
e. Trainer Goals 
(1) Train Recruits.  This behavior interacts with the 
recruit behavior of becoming an operator to produce operators for the 
organization.  This goal allows the trainer to continue training a recruit until that 
recruit’s experience has exceeded the threshold needed to become an operator. 
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(2) Send Operators to Leaders.  This goal interacts with 
the operator goal of joining a leader on a mission to introduce willing operators 
to leaders through the organize mission cell relationship.  The behavior of this 
goal allows the trainer to introduce the operator directly if he knows a leader, but 
if he does not, he can query those he knows in the organization to find one for 
him. 
f. Specialist Goals 
The three specialists, arms dealer, financier, and logistician all have 
the exact same goals since they are all resource providers.  The only difference 
between the three roles is the type of resource they provide. 
(1) Provide a Resource.  This goal encodes the behavior 
that the specialist has a cache of resources either at hand or on call that he has 
standing by for a leader to request.  Another behavior created by this goal is that 
a specialist has a minimum amount below which he will not provide the resource 
and instead return to restocking that resource.  In evaluating this goal, the 
specialist examines if a leader requested resources during the last turn via 
messaging (described below).  If so, then an additional weight is given to this 
goal, described below as well. 
(2) Produce a Resource.  With this goal, the specialist 
exhibits the behavior that he will produce resources until he exceeds his capacity 
to acquire the resource.  The agent’s influence value determines how much of a 
resource an agent can stockpile.  The idea with this design decision was that 
more influential specialists would have access to greater levels of resources as 
described above.  In evaluating this goal, the specialist checks if providing a 
resource was the active goal the turn before and if the agent did not provide a 
resource, then an additional weight is given to this goal so that the specialist has 
a chance to go back to producing resources and not become stuck on providing 
resources. 
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(3) Advance to a Leader.  Specialists also have a behavior 
that allows them to advance to a leader under certain conditions.  The first 
condition occurs if a specialist has become bored through continually providing 
a resource without anyone requesting that resource, he will go off and promote 
himself to a leader and start his own cell.  The other condition of this behavior 
occurs if the specialist becomes disavowed from the organization by losing his 
connections to the main network system, in which the specialist advances 
himself to a leader and starts a splinter cell. 
g. Leader Goals 
(1) Plan a Mission.  The primary behavior a leader 
exhibits is that he creates targets and organizes missions.  This goal allows the 
behavior that a leader can seclude himself away to plan the mission for short 
period of time, during which the leader does not perform any other tasks, nor is 
he as likely to interact with the rest of the organization during that period. 
(2) Get Operators for a Mission.  This goal gives leaders 
the behavior of seeking out the source of operators for missions: recruiters and 
trainers.  If the leader detects any recruiters or trainers he will try to contact 
them, much the same way recruiters introduce themselves to contacts.  If the 
leader does not know either one of these types of agents, then he will post a 
request to those he knows to find these agents so that he can get the agents he 
needs. 
(3) Request Resources.  Next to acquiring manpower, the 
other key behavior a leader needs to accomplish missions is to acquire the 
financial, logistical, and arms resources necessary to carry out the mission.  This 
goal allows the leader to exhibit one of two behaviors in accomplish this part of 
putting together a mission.  If the leader knows a specialist directly, then he 
attempts to contact the specialist and request the resource from him.  However, 
the specialist may not be available, but instead off creating more resources, so 
then the leader uses his other behavior to put out a request to the organization 
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requesting the resource.  While these requests are out, the leader’s impatience 
begins to grow, at which time the leader reveals his behavior to convert 
operators in his mission to the needed specialist role. 
(4) Convert an Operator to a Specialist.  This goal allows 
the leader to turn to the most influential operator in his mission and promote 
him to a specialist role.  The operator ceases to exist in that role, removing 
himself from the mission as an operator and takes on the responsibilities of 
creating the resources for the job he was promoted to.  When the operator leaves 
the mission, the leader will need to find a replacement for him, so the get 
operators for a mission behavior eventually re-emerges so that the leader can fill 
that vacancy. 
(5) Lead Mission Rehearsal.  The lead mission rehearsal 
goal gives the leader the behavior that once the preponderance of the resources 
for the mission have been obtained, all the necessary people have been recruited, 
and the leader knows a trainer who can setup the necessary training facilities for 
him, the leader can take his cell and run them through the mission for the 
required period of time.  Once the rehearsal finishes, the leader can return to 
gathering any remaining resources before launching off into the mission. 
(6) Lead Mission Execution.  This last behavior available 
to the leader lets him and/or his operators conduct the mission.  Once the 
mission finishes, each of the members of the mission gain possibly gain 
experience and influence, with the leader receiving a majority of the experience 
and influence, furthering the rich-get-richer phenomenon.  This goal also 
provides the members of the mission the behavior of resetting their goals, thus 
allowing them to participate in the next available mission and the leader can plan 
a new mission. 
7. Communication Model 
The TNS uses two methods of communication between the agents so that 
they may collaborate with each other and accomplish group as well as personal 
87 
goals.  As mentioned above this thesis incorporates John Hiles’ biological 
metaphor and concept of connectors to bring agents together, allowing them to 
take actions particular to the connection.  The thesis also uses the notion of a 
broadcast e-mail-like system for sending requests throughout the network. 
a. Connectors 
Connectors are used as a communication mechanism between 
agents that know each other, or between other agents one particular agent 
detects, such as between recruiters and contacts.  Connectors are implemented in 
the TNS using the listener model in Java.  The individual Relationship objects 
handle the responsibility for setting up and tearing down the listener mechanics.  
The stimulator connectors are handled through physical instantiations of 
Connector objects that change a state variable to indicate whether they are 
extended or retracted.  For the receptor connectors, their extended or retracted 
state is created using an if-then selection structure that only takes action if the 
type of connector that was extended is of a particular type, so like the biological 
metaphor, only the right proteins can attach to right receptors on the cellular 
surface (Hiles et. al., 2002 and Osborn, 2002, p. 55). 
b. Messaging Model 
The messaging model in the TNS allows agents to communicate 
with agents they are not directly linked to in the network, which is critical given 
that the connector communication paradigm only works within the confines of 
directly linked agents and in the use of the sensory model.  In the messaging 
model, messages are placed in an outbox, evaluated to whether or not they 
should be sent to a particular person, delivered, placed in other agents’ inboxes, 
and then when an agent checks his inbox, he evaluates whether or not those 
messages should be answered.  Each message includes the originator (so that the 
person who answers it knows who sent it), the intended target, stated in terms of 
the role that should answer the message, the type of ticket to execute when the 
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Figure 10.   Components of a Message. 
 
This communication does include three important optimizations 
that prevent the complete explosion in the number of messages being passed 
through the network, while leaving one optimization for future work.  The first 
optimization prevents agents from forwarding a message back to the sender.  So, 
if agent A sends a message to agent B, agent B will not re-send the message back 
to agent A, or “ping-pong” as shown in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11.   Preventing “Ping-Pong” Messages. 
 
The second optimization kills loops in the messaging system.  If 
agent A sends to agent B who sends to agent C and agent C knows agent A, 
agent C won’t send the message to agent A because it would create a loop in the 
messaging process as shown in Figure 12. 
Message = {Originator, Target Role, Ticket Type, Type Identifier} 
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Figure 12.   Preventing Message Loops. 
 
To accomplish these optimizations, messages keep track of the 
forward chain for the message with a collection of agent pairs that identify the 
sender and the receiver.  So when agent A sends to agent B who sends to agent 
C, the message chain becomes an ordered set of pairs, looking like {{A, B}, {B, C}} 




Figure 13.   Message Chain Between a Set of Agents. 
 
The third optimization prevented multiple messages from being 
sent for the same type of request, just from different agents.  If recruits A, B, & C 
also needed to get trained and recruiter D did not know a trainer, then without 
this optimization, recruiter D would send one message for each of the recruits, 
creating an exponential explosion in the number of messages.  However, agents 
keep track of the types of messages they send with a fully qualified name that 
includes the Java class name, the type of the intended recipient, and the identifier 
of the originator as shown in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14.   Fully Qualified Names of Messages. 
 
Agents only send out one message for each fully qualified named 
message in the agent’s outbox. 
The one optimization the author’s left for future work was to only 
send messages directly down paths within the network to known targets, thus 
reducing message traffic significantly and improving the overall performance of 
the system.  If agent A is connected to agents B, C, and D, C is connected to agent 
E, and agent A wants to send a message to E, the current model would send the 
message to B, C, and D, and the message would still arrive in E’s inbox, but the 
other agent’s would still forward the message even though they did not need to.  
The optimization would be to examine the agent’s mental map, determine the 
necessary path for the message to reach the target, and create a message chain 
that ensured the message only followed the specified path.  The bold arrows in 
Figure 15 demonstrate this optimization. 
 
 
Figure 15.   Message Optimization. 
 
Before a message is sent or before it is answered, it is evaluated on 





benefit greater than risk, or as the authors have abbreviated it, B > R, was that the 
benefit of sending or answering a message had to outweigh the risk of answering 
the message and possibly being observed by the enemy. 
c. Benefits 
Benefits model the various reasons why a terrorist agent sends, 
forwards, or responds to a message. 
(1) Organizational.  An agent’s allegiance defines the 
organizational benefit.  This benefit models the behavior that in general, the 
more committed an agent is to the organization the more likely the agent will act 
on the message. 
(2) Personal.  The personal benefit models the fact that 
people are generally somewhat selfish in nature and that they are more likely to 
serve their own needs before those of others and therefore will send their own 
messages. 
(3) Influence.  The influence benefit models the fact that 
who sent the message matters.  If an influential arms dealer receives a message 
from some low level operator looking for a leader so that he may join a mission, 
the arms dealer will be less likely to pass the message than if the sender of the 
message was an influential leader such as Osama bin Laden looking for 
operators to join his latest mission. 
(4) Goal Completion.  The goal completion benefit 
reflects the fact that if responding to the message would bring the agent closer to 
completing a goal, then the agent is more likely to answer that message. 
(5) Mission Draw.  The mission draw benefit models the 
fact that if a leader needs a resource for an important mission that an agent might 







Risks model the reasons a terrorist agent refuses to send, forward, 
or answer a message. 
(1) Familiarity.  The familiarity risks models the fact that 
people are more likely to communicate with people they know than complete 
strangers.  This risk allows agents to build a rapport with each other over time so 
that their familiarity risk is eventually driven down to zero and two agents 
become more likely to communicate with each other because of the relationship 
they have developed. 
(2) Separation.  The separation risk models that people 
are more likely to do some task for someone within their own circle of friends or 
known associates.  If a person asks someone else to do something for his sister’s 
friend’s husband’s cousin, that person is probably pretty unlikely to perform that 
task because of the amount of separation.  However, for a person’s immediate 
friends and maybe their friends the amount of separation probably is reasonable. 
(3) Goal Synchronization.  This risk models the fact that 
in planning, preparing, and carrying out missions, agents progress along a story 
line template of particular stages, and that like any traditional story during 
certain stages some events make sense to happen and in some stages others do 
not.  During the climax of a story, it would not make sense to introduce entirely 
new main characters to the story.  Likewise, as an agent progresses along the 
story line of the life cycle of a mission, it makes sense for an agent to process or 
participate in certain types of communications and ignore others.  While 
Mohammed Atta is in Boston about to board a plane destined for the north 
World Trade Center building and he gets a call from an associate looking for 
Mohammed to introduce a friend to a well-connected arms dealer, Mohammed 
wouldn’t take the call because he’s in the middle of an important mission in 
which he knows he’s going to die for the glory of his cause.    The message type 
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identifier is used in evaluating the goal synchronization risk against a table 
created by the authors to model this behavior. 
(4) Status.  The status risk models the fact that the 
terrorist agents have a certain stature within the organization and that their time 
is valuable.  Therefore, if an influential logistician receives a request from some 
second-rate leader looking for some fake passports, he is probably going to turn 
him down because the leader is beneath him, but if he receives a call from Pablo 
Escobar looking for the same thing, he’s probably going to accommodate him.  
To place the status risk on par with mission draw for the purpose of processing 
the “get resource” message as described below, this risk is based on the product 
of the specialist’s influence and experience. 
e. Inbox 
Each agent has an inbox that other agent’s can place messages in.  
At the start of any agent’s turn, that agent will process the messages in his inbox.  
The agent first checks the target role to see if it matches one of his roles.  If it does 
not, then he places the message in his outbox to be forwarded on.  If the agent 
has a role that matches the target role, then the agent evaluates the benefits and 
risks of answering the message.  If the benefits exceed the risks, then the agent 
takes the action specified in the message’s content, which is in the form of a 
ticket.  The last action an agent takes in answering a message is to look at the 
message’s forwarding chain and if any of the agents or links between them are 
missing from the agent’s mental map he adds those nodes and links.  As each 
message is examined it is removed from the agent’s inbox. 
f. Outbox 
Each agent also has an outbox for sending messages to other 
agents.  At the end of an agent’s turn, the agent will process the messages in his 
outbox.  The agent keeps track of the messages he has processed by their fully 
qualified name, so he does not send more than one message of any given fully 
qualified name.  If the agent hasn’t send a message of a given type, then he first 
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checks to see if he is the originator or if he is forwarding the message.  Next, he 
evaluates the benefits and risks of sending or forwarding the message.  If the 
benefits exceed the risks, then he creates a new message forwarding chain if he 
originated the message, or adds a new element to the chain if he is forwarding 
the message.  The agent then puts the message in the recipient’s inbox and lastly 
annotates how many times the agent has communicated with the recipient.  This 
annotation is used in determining how familiar an agent is with another agent 
when evaluating the familiarity risk. 
g. Messages 
Messages provide agents with the ability to find people within the 
organization, seek out resource providers, and get in touch with leaders who 
need operators for their missions. 
(1) Find a Person.  This type of message provides an 
agent the capability to find an agent with a particular role if the agent does not 
know one directly.  This message allows the originator to create a direct link to 
an agent with the desired role. 
(2) Get a Resource.  This message allows a leader to seek 
out resource providers if he does not know any, or to try to persuade a known 
specialist that isn’t responding to the leader’s attempt to use a connector to reach 
the specialist because the specialist is off producing a resource. 
(3) Seek out a Leader.  Operators use this message to find 
leaders who need manpower for their mission.  Operators use this type of 
message when the trainer they just trained with does not know a leader directly.  
8. Tickets 
As mentioned above, tickets encapsulate procedural knowledge for the 
agents.  A unique adaptation of tickets in the TNS, tickets inherit from a class in a 
discreet event simulation package called Simkit, described below, that allows 
them to be placed on an event list and therefore scheduled to occur on future 
turns.  The only ticket that currently uses this scheme is the leader’s “plan a 
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mission” ticket.  The authors discussed using this for resource production, but 
that implementation has been left for future work. 
a. Contact Tickets 
(1) Make Contact.  When a recruiter recruits a contact, 
the contact creates a permanent connector to the recruiter, or a link in the 
network, and the recruiter does the same with the contact.  They both also add 
each the other person to their mental maps.  The contact then marks the make 
contact goal complete. 
(2) Become a Recruit.  The next step that a contact takes is 
to change roles to a recruit and mark the “become a recruit goal” complete. 
b. Recruit Tickets 
(1) Prove Allegiance.  The recruit uses this ticket to 
extend a connector the recruiter can hear so that the recruit can be initiated. 
(2) Get Trained.  Like the prove allegiance ticket, the 
recruit uses this ticket to extend a connector for the recruiter so the recruit can 
get in touch with a trainer. 
(3) Become an Operator.  The connector in this ticket is 
heard by a trainer, who then trains the operator for the turn. 
c. Operator Tickets 
(1) Join a Leader on a Mission.  If the operator knows at 
least one leader, he first picks out the leaders that need operators on their 
missions and then he looks at the draw value for their missions.  The operator 
joins the leader with the highest draw mission, receiving the leader’s target and 
resetting a “stuck counter” that determines how bored an operator is (and how 
close to advancing to a trainer) and how impatient a leader is for finding 
recruiters and trainers.  If the operator does not know a leader directly, he will 
extend a connector the trainer can hear and he will put a seek leader message in 
his outbox unless a trainer hears his connector and therefore connects with the 
operator.  If the trainer does connect with the operator, the trainer will interrupt 
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this ticket, thus preventing the message from being placed in the outbox.  The 
reason for this modeling decision was to work with how connectors and the 
listener model operate.  The way the model operates is that the extender of a 
stimulator connector does not know if a receptor connector made a connection 
unless the agent on the receptor end changes some state variable in the agent on 
the stimulator end.  Therefore, for the ease of encoding the desired behavior, it 
was easier to simply put a frame in the ticket to put a message in the outbox in 
the case that the connector was not heard and the ticket therefore not 
interrupted.  
(2) Rehearse a Mission.  This ticket increases a counter 
for the number of turns the operator has rehearsed a mission.  If the counter 
reaches the required number of turns then the rehearse mission goal is marked 
complete. 
(3) Execute a Mission.  Like the “rehearse a mission” 
ticket, this ticket increases a counter for the number of turns the operator has 
executed a mission.  When the counter reaches the required number of turns, 
then the mission execution goal is marked complete, the operator receives 
experience and influence from the mission, all of his goals are reset, and his 
current target is cleared out so he can join a new mission. 
(4) Advance to a Trainer.  This ticket removes the 
operator from a mission if he is in one and then changes the operator’s role to 
that of a trainer on one caveat.  The operator will only become a trainer if the 
system can handle having another trainer.  The ratio between the number of 
operators in the system and the number of trainers in the system is computed 
and if that ratio exceeds a particular value then the operator can become a 
trainer.  The idea behind this modeling decision was to prevent the system from 





d. Recruiter Tickets 
(1) Find Contacts.  With this ticket the recruiter extends a 
connector that sensed contacts could hear and then make a decision whether or 
not to join the organization. 
(2) Verify Recruits’ Allegiance.  This ticket gives the 
recruiter the ability to increase the allegiance value of recruits until they reach a 
threshold at which time the recruits are eligible to get trained. 
(3) Send Recruits to Training.  In this ticket the recruiter 
checks to see if he knows any trainers directly.  If he does, he looks the each 
trainer’s influence and sends the recruits to the trainer with the highest influence, 
supporting the rich-get-richer phenomenon.  The recruit and the trainer each 
create a link to each other and add the other person to their mental maps.  The 
recruiter then receives either experience or influence for each recruit he sends to 
a trainer.  If the recruiter does not know a trainer directly, then he sends out a 
find person message looking for a trainer role. 
e. Trainer Tickets 
(1) Train Recruits.  This ticket works like the recruiter’s 
“verify recruits’ allegiance” ticket in that the trainer gives each recruit he is 
training a point of experience.  If the recruit’s experience exceeds a threshold, 
then the trainer turns the recruit into an operator. 
(2) Send Operators to Leaders.  This ticket works like a 
blend between the recruiter’s “send recruits to training” ticket and the operator’s 
“join leader on a mission” ticket.  The trainer checks to see if he knows any 
leaders directly.  If he does, he finds the leaders who need operators for their 
missions.  Next he finds the leader with the highest draw mission and introduces 
the operator to the leader.  The operator receives the leader’s target and resets his 
“stuck” or bored counter and the leader’s “stuck” counter for finding operators.  
The trainer then receives a point of experience or influence for each operator he 
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sends to a leader.  If the trainer doesn’t know any leaders at all or any leaders 
that need operators, he sends out a find person message looking for a leader role. 
f. Specialist Tickets 
The tickets for each of the specialists are the same except for the 
type of resources they provide or produce. 
(1) Provide a Resource.  When a specialist hears a 
connector from a leader requesting a resource, the specialist looks at his current 
level of resource before trying to provide the resource.  The specialist provides 
resources to the leader up to either the amount requested by the leader or the 
amount the specialist has on hand, which ever is smaller.  The specialist then 
receives either a point of experience or influence for every point of resource that 
was exchanged.  The specialist then sets a Boolean latch that indicates that the 
specialist provided resources during the turn.  This latch is used in the 
evaluation of the produce a resource goal as described above. 
(2) Produce a Resource.  This ticket allows the specialist 
to increase his stockpile of resources.  The specialist’s stockpile is increased by a 
random amount based on a right triangle distribution as shown in Figure 8 
above, using the specialist’s experience as the maximum and mean value. 
(3) Advance to a Leader.  This ticket allows a specialist to 
potentially advance to a leader role.  If the specialist is not directly connected to a 
leader (which means most likely the specialist has become disconnected from the 
network, or disavowed), then the specialist changes to a leader.  If the specialist 
is still connected to a leader, then a similar check occurs as was described for 
operators advancing to trainers.  If the ratio of operators to leaders in the system 
exceeds a certain threshold, then the specialist will advance to a leader.  Again, 
the reason for this modeling decision was to avoid saturating the system with 
leaders, who would subsequently require operators and operators are a scarcer 
resource than those the specialists provide, as will be discussed further below. 
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g. Leader Tickets 
(1) Get Operators for a Mission.  This ticket increments 
one of two “stuck” counters the leader has.  The “stuck” counters allow goals to 
bubble up to the highest weighted goal over time, thus allowing the goal to 
become active.  The stuck counter for getting operators was created to help the 
“get operators” goal bubble up to the top so that a leader would take action to 
find the source of operators: recruiters and trainers.  This ticket works in concert 
with the find recruiters and find trainers tickets. 
(2) Find Recruiters.  This ticket works similarly to the 
“join a leader on a mission” ticket.  If the leader does not know a recruiter, then 
the leader extends a connector that sensed recruiters can hear and puts a find 
person message for a recruiter role in the outbox unless a recruiter hears the 
connector and interrupts the ticket.  The purpose of this ticket is to put the leader 
in contact with the source of new recruits in the organization. 
(3) Find Trainers.  This ticket works exactly like the “find 
recruiters” ticket, except that it is designed for connecting to trainers. 
(4) Plan a Mission.  This ticket creates a new target and a 
new mission for the leader.  This ticket is unique in that it is scheduled via a 
discrete event simulation mechanism discussed below so that the ticket actually 
takes place some number of turns later and the leader “blocks” on the plan 
mission goal, much the same way network sockets block until they connect, until 
the leader creates a target and mission.  The purpose for this design decision was 
to allow operators attached to a leader that just completed a mission the ability to 
become mobile and potentially migrate to another leader.  If the leader did not 
take more than one turn to create a target and mission, the leader would always 
have the same operators in his missions and other leaders in the system might 
starve on the need for operators.  By allowing operators to migrate between 
leaders, the system as a whole can progress further on accomplishing missions.  
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When the leader finishes planning a mission the “plan a mission” goal is marked 
complete. 
(5) Request Resources.  The tickets for requesting 
resources (the leader has one for each type of resource the specialists provide) 
increments the leader’s stuck counter for requesting resources.  If the leader does 
not have all the operators needed for a mission, the stuck counter for getting 
operators is incremented as well.  The reason for incrementing the counter for 
getting operators is if the leader is just starting out and his goal for getting 
operators has a low weight, but the leader does not know any specialists, he’ll 
never satisfy his request resource goals and the leader will remain stuck on those 
goals.  Therefore, by incrementing the counter for getting operators allows the 
leader to find a source of operators and the leader can promote operators to 
specialists, therefore the leader can grow a network.  The other counter is used to 
model the leader’s impatience with waiting for a specialist to provide a resource 
or for the leader to get in touch with a specialist that has a needed resource.  This 
counter is used to weight the “convert an operator to a specialist” goal, which in 
turn allows the leader to turn an operator into the needed specialist and the 
leader can progress along on the mission, albeit at probably a slower rate since 
the newly converted specialist will likely been unskilled.  This type of ticket is 
also interruptible.  The leader extends a connector specific to the type of resource 
requested and if a corresponding specialist hears the connector, then the ticket is 
interrupted, preventing the get resource message from being placed in the 
leader’s outbox. 
(6) Convert an Operator to a Specialist.  This ticket allows 
the leader to convert his most experienced operator into a specialist to satisfy an 
outstanding resource requirement.  The leader finds the most experienced 
operator and then extends a connector that the operator can hear, resulting in the 
operator changing roles to the desired specialist.  The ticket also resets the stuck 
counter for requesting a resource. 
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(7) Lead Mission Rehearsal.  This ticket simply extends a 
connector that operators in the mission can hear, which causes the operators to 
execute their “rehearse mission” ticket described above.  The leader also 
performs similar actions as the operators. 
(8) Lead Mission Execution.  This ticket works like the 
“lead mission rehearsal” ticket, except that it is used for executing missions. 
 
 
h. Messaging Tickets 
(1) Find a Person.  When this ticket is executed, the 
recipient and the originator create links to each other, they update their mental 
maps with the message chain as described above, and lastly they update the 
history value for each of the pairs represented by the message chain.  Adjusting 
the amount the pairs receive affects the look of the network topology.  The less 
the chain is rewarded, the easier relationships eventually degrade and fall apart, 
resulting in a more plausible looking scale-free network. 
(2) Get a Resource.  When this ticket is executed, the 
recipient of the message and the originator of the message create links to each 
other, update their mental maps based on the message chain, and the history 
values of the message pairs in the message chain are updated.  This ticket also 
sets a resource requested latch for the specialist, which is used in evaluating the 
provide resources goal as mentioned above.  This ticket also calculates the 
weighting applied to the specialist’s provide resource goal. 
(3) Seek out a Leader.  Just like the other message tickets, 
the recipient and the originator create links to each other, update their mental 
maps based on the message chain, and update the histories of the agent pairs in 
the message chain.  The operator receives the target from the leader, then the 
leader’s stuck counter for getting operators is reset and lastly the operator’s stuck 







a. Find Contacts 
Recruiters extend this connector so that contacts can connect with it 
and make a decision to join the organization or turn the offer down. 
b. Prove Allegiance 
Recruits extend this connector that recruiters can connect with so 
that recruits can get initiated and become eligible for training. 
c. Get Trained 
Recruits extend this connector that recruiters can connect with so 
that the recruiter can introduce recruits to a trainer. 
d. Become an Operator 
Recruits extend this connector that trainers can connect with and 
provide training to the recruits. 
e. Join a Leader on a Mission 
Operators extend this connector that trainers can connect with so 
that the trainer can introduce the operator to a leader. 
f. Request a Resource 
Leaders extend these types of connectors that specialists can 
connect with to provide the leader with needed resources for conducting a 
mission. 
g. Lead Mission Rehearsal 
Leaders extend this connector that the operators in their mission 
can connect with and increment their rehearsal counters, indicating progress in 
mission rehearsal. 
h. Lead Mission Execution 
Leaders extend this connector that the operators in their mission 




i. Convert an Operator to a Specialist 
Leaders extend this connector that operators in their mission can 
connect with (they always have a receptor connector for this stimulator extended 
once they are in a mission) so that the leader can promote them to a specialist 
role. 
j. Find a Recruiter 
Leaders extend this connector like the connectors that recruiters use 
to find contacts, but leaders use this connector to find recruiters so that they can 
obtain a source of operators for their missions. 
k. Find a Trainer 
Leaders extend this connector just like the “find a recruiter” 
connector, except this one is used to find trainers. 
10. Actions 
a. Extend a Connector 
This action simply extends a connector and then subsequently 
retracts it.  If agent connects with the connector, then tickets fire for both of the 
agents before the connector is retracted. 
b. Make a Double Link 
In this action an agent takes the other agent in the connection and 
adds the other agent to his mental map; the process occurs for both agents.  The 
agents are added to a container of directly linked agents and to a container of 
known agents.  The mental map creates an agent pair for the two agents if one 
did not already exist. 
c. Mark a Goal Complete 
This action does simply as its title suggests. 
d. Change Roles 
This action removes the agent from the relationships associated 
with the current role, removes the role from the agent’s collection of roles, creates 
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the new Role object and adds the role to the agent’s collection of roles.  The 
agent loses the goals associated with the old role and gains the new goals 
associated with the new role. 
e. Recruit Verification 
This action adds a point to the recruit’s allegiance value.  If the 
recruit’s allegiance value then exceeds a threshold set by the recruit training 
relationship, then the recruit’s “prove allegiance” goal is marked complete. 
f. Reward an Action 
This action iterates a number of times equal to a scalar value, as 
mentioned above in the tickets that use this action, and awards one experience 
point or one influence point on an equal basis during each iteration.  When that 
part of the action is finished, the agent is awarded allegiance on a triangle 
distribution with a minimum of –1, a maximum of 1, and a mid-point of 0.5.  The 
reason for the modeling decision to use this distribution for allegiance was that a 
terrorist agent can gain influence or experience based the event that they just 
participated in, whether it be sending an operator to a leader, exchanging 
resources, or finishing a mission, but the agent either has a good experience, a 
bad experience, or a neutral experience.  The authors weighted the distribution 
so that agents had a lower chance of having a bad experience and a higher 
chance of having a neutral experience, so that an agent’s commitment to the 
organization slowly increased over time.  A feature the authors left for future 
work was to remove an agent from the organization when the allegiance value 
dropped below a certain threshold. 
g. Put a Message in the Outbox 
This action creates a new message using Java’s reflection 
capabilities and then places the object in the agent’s outbox. 
h. Train Recruits 
This action works much like the recruit verification action, except it 
adds a point to the recruit’s experience value.  When the value exceeds a 
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threshold set by the recruit training relationship, the recruit changes roles to an 
operator. 
i. Receive a Target from Leader 
This action adds the operator to the leader’s mission and the 
operator receives information about the target. 
j. Interrupt Another Ticket 
This action simply causes another ticket to stop executing by setting 
a Boolean flag in the target ticket. 
k. Rehearse a Mission 
This action increments a mission rehearsal counter.  If the counter 
exceeds the required number of rehearsal turns for the target, then the mission 
rehearsal goal is marked complete. 
l. Execute a Mission 
This action increments a mission execution counter.  If the counter 
exceeds the required number of execution turns for the target, then the agents in 
the mission receive experience and influence.  The amount of reward points 
available to the agents in the mission is the draw value of the mission.  The 
leader always receives the largest share of the reward, with a minimum of 25%.  
The rest of the operators in the mission receive a reward proportional to their 
influence plus experience compared to the sum of influence and experience from 
each of the operators in the mission.  Therefore, more influential and experienced 
operators receive more influence and experience than their less experienced and 
influential brethren, furthering the rich-get-richer phenomenon.  The reward 
value becomes the scalar used in the reward action described above.  Lastly, this 
action marks the mission execution goal complete. 
m. Mission Cleanup 
This action removes the mission rehearsal and mission execute 
tickets from both the operators and the leader and replaces them with new ones 
since they were modified when the mission was completed by the “execute a 
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mission” action above.  The action then resets all of the goals for the operators 
and the leader and lastly clears out the target information for the operators and 
clears out the mission and target information for the leader. 
n. Remove Self from a Mission 
This action removes the operator from the mission, creating a 
vacancy that the leader now has to fill.  The operator’s goals are all reset except 
for the advance goal and the target information is cleared out for the operator. 
o. Produce a Mission 
This action creates a target and then creates a mission, associating 
the target with the mission. 
p. Increment a Stuck Counter 
This action simply increases the stuck counter for the agent. 
q. Reset a Stuck Counter 
This action simply resets the stuck counter for the agent. 
r. Increment a Get Operators Stuck Counter 
This action increments a separate stuck counter the leader role uses 
as described above. 
s. Reset a Get Operators Stuck Counter 
This action resets the separate stuck counter the leader uses as 
described above. 
t. Produce a Resource 
This action produces a random number of resource points using a 
right triangle distribution with the maximum and mean set to the same value as 
the specialist’s experience value. 
u. Resource Exchange 
This action increments the resource level collected for the leader’s 
mission and decrements the resource level the specialist has on hand as 
described above.  This action also rewards the specialist using a scalar equal to 
the number of resource points exchanged. 
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v. Set a Latch for Requesting a Resource 
This action simply sets a Boolean latch for the specialist indicating 
that a leader requested a resource from the specialist via a message as described 
above. 
w. Set a Latch for Providing a Resource 
This action simply sets a Boolean latch for the specialist indicating 
that the specialist did provide resources during the turn. 
x. Increment a Provide Resource Goal Weighting 
This action creates a weight value to be added to the specialist’s 
“provide a resource” goal if the specialist processes a “get resource” message.  
The amount of the additional weight is the difference between the draw of the 
leader’s mission and the status risk of the specialist.  If a leader and a specialist 
on nearly on par with each other in terms of influence and experience, this value 
should be small, reflecting the relative influential power agents have with each 
other when dealing with missions and resources. 
y. Update Mental Map from a Message Chain 
This action takes a message's forwarding chain and updates the 
mental maps of the originator and the recipient by adding nodes and links from 
the chain that are absent in the respective agents' mental maps. 
E. SIMULATION DESCRIPTION 
1. Overview 
The Terrorist Network Simulation (TNS) demonstrates that a Multi-Agent 
System build around the descriptions of the interactions between the various 
roles in a plausible terrorist organization does indeed form a scale-free network 
without direct intervention or top-down control.  The authors wanted to describe 
the life cycle of terrorist agents and the organization as it plans, prepares, and 
carries out terrorist missions.  Therefore, the authors decided to create a turn-
based simulation, where each agent senses other agents, determines which 
agents to form relationships with, what goal to perform, and what messages to 
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process.  The turn-based structure of the simulation allows the organization to 
evolve temporally while preserving certain mechanics that make the simulation 
possible. 
2. Turn Structure 
To preserve the idea of preferential attachment and the rich-get-richer 
phenomenon, at the beginning of each turn the agents are sorted into a list in 
decreasing order of influence.  This sorting allows the most influential agents to 
always take their turn before the less influential ones.  Next, the history values 
for each of the agent pairs in the simulation are decremented to create the aging 
relationship behavior in the model.  The next part of the turn constitutes the 
main section where agents take their individual turns.  Each agent first processes 
his inbox, and then he checks for sensed contacts.  He adds those agents he 
senses to those he is directly connected to as his sensed environment and uses 
that sensed environment as necessary for evaluating his goals, which comes next.  
After evaluating his goals, he takes the highest weighted goal and executes 
whatever ticket is associated with that goal.  Some tickets are not executed until 
the agent connects to another agent’s connector, so some goals do not have 
tickets that necessarily execute during the agent’s turn, but get executed on 
another agent’s turn when a connection is made.  The last part of each agent’s 
turn is to process his outbox.  Once all the agents have taken their turns, the 
simulation checks for any relationships that should be terminated because their 
history dropped past a minimum threshold.  The last part of the turn is to 
remove any contacts that have not been contacted for a set number of turns or 
have been contacted, but decided not to join the organization.  The turn structure 





Figure 16.   TNS Turn Structure. 
 
3. Discreet-Event Simulation Elements 
The authors wanted to introduce contacts into the simulation using a 
plausible arrival process, so they turned to the discreet event simulation (DES) 
package Simkit, primarily developed by Dr. Arnie Buss of the MOVES Institute 
at NPS.  Once the basic integration of the Simkit libraries was made with the 
TNS, recruiters were added to arrive into the simulation, a timing thread was 
included to enhance the graphical rendering, and tickets were extended such that 
they could be scheduled as well. 
a. Simkit 
Simkit provides the developer with powerful tools to create 
discreet event simulations ranging from the trivial to complex.  A DES is 
controlled via an event list and an event list consists of events that have been 
schedule to occur at a particular time in the simulation.  No simulation time 
passes during an event, just between events.  The earliest scheduled event 
currently on the event list becomes the next event executed.  Events can have a 
priority, so if two events have the same time scheduled on the event list, the 
higher priority event occurs first (Buss, 2001, p. 1).  The TNS schedules turn 
events to occur one (1) unit of simulation time apart.  Each turn event schedules a 
1. Sort the agent list 
2. Decrement agent pair history values 
3. Agent turns 
a. Process inbox 
b. Sense/detect agents 
c. Check relationships 
d. Evaluate goals 
e. Execute active goal 
f. Process outbox 
4. Check for aging relationships 
5. Remove contacts that did not join 
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new turn event to occur one (1) unit later.  Due to the turn-based nature of the 
TNS, all events on the event list are integer time steps. 
In the TNS, Simkit controls two arrival processes, one for contacts 
and one for recruiters.  An arrival process is a scheduling process by which the 
times between the arrivals of new events are independent and identically 
distributed (IID) random variables.  IID random variables come from the same 
probability distribution (Law and Kelton, 2000, pp. 12-13).  The TNS uses a 
Poisson arrival process because is the most common type of arrival process (Law 
and Kelton, 2000, p. 389).  The Poisson arrival process uses an exponential 
probability distribution for the interarrival times, or the times between the 
arrivals of new entities into the simulation.  Contacts arrive into the simulation at 
a much higher frequency than recruiters.  Even so, the authors found that 
contacts become the scarcest resource for the leaders in putting together their 
missions since an arrival process controls the generation of new contacts.  The 
specialists can generate numerous points of a given resource in a particular turn 
while contacts continue to arrive less frequently into the simulation.  As such, the 
random number seed for determine a mission’s operator requirements is 
typically much smaller than that of the other resource requirements because of 
this disparity between the production capabilities of the two resources.  
Examining the resource production model for further refinement has been left for 
future work, although the authors did consider using an inventory model 
combined with the ability to schedule tickets that produce resources for future 
turns. 
b. Discreet Event Graph 
Discreet event graphs are used to visually represent a discreet 
event simulation.  Event graphs depict how events from one from the other, how 
events are scheduled, and what the times are between events.  Event graphs also 
show the significant state variables used in the simulation related to events.  
111 
Event graphs show event listeners if any are present in the simulation.  The event 
graph for the TNS is shown below in Figure 17. 
 
 
Figure 17.   TNS Event Graph. 
 
c. Listener Models 
As seen above in Figure 17 the TNS event graph incorporates 
several event listeners.  These event listeners work much the same as the 
connector listeners.  In the scheme of the event model, when a contact or 
recruiter arrival event occurs, the main simulation hears that event through the 
listener model.  Subsequently, the main simulation invokes methods that create 






Whenever a turn event happens in the main simulation, a helper 
class hears that event an invokes a sleep() method on a Thread object.  This 
timing event slows down the graphical rendering of the network so that users 
can see the network evolve at a reasonable speed. 
4. Graphics 
The authors decided to adapt an open source project designed to display 
and manipulate graphs (a superset of networks) vice trying to write their own.  
This decision saved countless hours of work, leaving the authors the ability to 
concentrate on the simulation itself.  The graphics used in the project were not 
without some issues however as mentioned below.  The package used by the 
authors was TouchGraph. 
a. TouchGraph 
The TouchGraph package of classes was designed by Alex Shapiro 
and can be found at the TouchGraph website, www.touchgraph.com, under the 
Development section, http://touchgraph.sourceforge.net/index.html.  TouchGraph was 
designed with interactive graph and network exploration by the user in mind, 
but the package’s graph rendering capabilities were more than adequate for use 
in the TNS even though the TNS was not designed with user interaction in mind.  
The TNS uses TouchGraph version 1.21.  Figure 18 below shows what a basic 
TouchGraph application looks like. 
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Figure 18.   Basic TouchGraph Application. 
 
b. Adaptations to TouchGraph 
The authors used the TouchGraph display in two places in the 
simulation.  The main simulation window uses a descendent of a TouchGraph 
GLPanel.  The authors wrote their own constructors, and overwrote the 
initialize(), createGraph(), addUIs(), and buildPanel() methods to 
fit their needs for the simulation.  TouchGraph interaction is controlled through 
user interface (UI) classes.  The authors created their own UI class, 
GLExplicitUI (named after the network’s explicit map, or ground truth), 
following the pattern the TouchGraph designers used for their GLEditUI.  The 
GLExplicitUI class included code to launch agent “brain lids,” which are 
graphical displays that provide information about a particular agent.  “Brain 
lids” are explained further below.  An example of the resulting main simulation 
panel is shown below in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19.   Example Main Simulation Panel. 
 
Figure 19 above shows the various types of agents in the simulation 
and how they are graphically represented.  Each agent role is assigned a color 
and a symbol to aid in picking out the agents in the network, particularly when 














Role Symbol Color 
Contact C Light grey 
Recruit r Grey 
Operator O Dark grey 
Recruiter R Blue 
Trainer T Yellow 
Arms Dealer A Orange 
Logistician Lg Magenta 
Financier F Green 
Leader L Red 
Multiple Role 
agent 




Table 1.   Agent Role Colors and Symbols. 
 
The UI class provides several controls for viewing the network: 
zoom, rotate, locality, and drag.  Zoom and rotate functions are self-explanatory.  
The user can grab either a node or the screen itself to drag the network around 
for better viewing.  Once a node is selected by a single left mouse click, the 
locality control allows the user to see those agents that are a specified degree of 
separation from the selected agent.  The slider bar on the top of the display 
controls the degrees of separation.  Figure 20 below shows what the graph looks 
like when the locality control is dialed down to a value of one.  The little red 
squares in the upper right portion of the nodes contain a number indicating the 
number of links or edges connected to that node but are hidden from view. 
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Figure 20.   Locality Control. 
 
In the TNS, when two agents form a link between each other, two 
edges are created, one in each direction, hence the difference in the look of the 
links in the TNS from the normal TouchGraph links as shown in Figure 20 above.  
When new agents appear in the simulation, when they disappear from the 
simulation, and when links are created and destroyed, the simulation 
dynamically draws the changes.  These changes are made possible through the 
listener models employed in the TNS. 
c. Listener Models 
The TNS graphics packages use listeners for changes in nodes, 
links, and agent state.  The explicit map drawing panel, TNSPanel, listens to 
each agent in the simulation for changes in links to the explicit map.  When new 
agents are added to the simulation or when agents are removed from the 
simulation (currently only contacts who are not contacted or do not join the 
organization are removed), the TNSPanel is notified of the changes.  In the agent 
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“brain lids” state change listeners are used to update both graphics and tabular 
data as will be explained further below. 
d. Agent “Brain Lids” 
An agent “brain lid” provides the user the ability to peek inside an 
agent to see the agent’s roles, goals, personality, and mental map.  Some roles 
have specialized panels that provide additional information particular to those 
roles.  An agent “brain lid” for a leader role is shown below in Figure 21. 
 
 
Figure 21.   “Brain Lid” for a Leader Role. 
 
On the left side of the “brain lid” is the agent’s information and on 
the right side the mental map.  In the goals section of the agent info the goal 
weight for each goal is shown in parenthesis to the right of each goal and the 
active goal is highlighted in red.  Completed goals are marked with a check to 
the left of the goal.  The “brain lid” shown in Figure 21 above shows a panel for 
the leader’s mission at the bottom of the agent information.  The number to the 
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right of the word “mission” in the border title is the target’s draw.  The status of 
the leader’s stuck counters are displayed and then the mission requirements are 
shown next with how much the leader has followed by how much the leader 
needs.  Operators that have joined the mission are shown to the right of the 
mission information panel. 
The mental map on the right side of the “brain lid” shows the 
agent’s worldview of the network.  Only those agents the agent knows directly 
or knows about indirectly through messaging are displayed on the mental map.  
Links in the mental map are unidirectional, which highlight the indirect links in 
the agent’s mental map, those links between agents only known about, but not 
directly linked to.  The mental map-drawing panel has link and node change 
listeners like its parent, TNSPanel.  The “brain lid” itself listens to changes in the 
agent’s state so that the “brain lid” can dynamically update the agent’s 
information.  This capability makes it easy for a user to follow a leader’s mission 
and watch the progression on the “brain lid” and the explicit map.  A brain lid 
for a specialist is shown below in Figure 22. 
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Figure 22.   “Brain Lid” for a Specialist. 
 
Specialists have a panel that shows the current level of their 
resource and the status of their stuck counter.  The “brain lid” for an operator in 
a mission is shown below in Figure 23. 
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Figure 23.   Operator “Brain Lid”. 
 
The operator “brain lid” shows the mission the operator is part of 
by displaying the draw of the mission’s target and the leader who is leading the 
mission. 
e. Graphics Issues 
The graphics displaying capabilities of TouchGraph worked the 
majority of the time.  Occasionally though the drawing panels of the explicit 
and/or cognitive maps would blank out without explanation.  When the number 
of debugging statements was reduced the frequency of graphics panel crashes 
appeared to be less frequent.  TouchGraph has some minor issues with the 
drawing of links when the locality number is low such that links are draw 
without their associated nodes on the other end.  Also, sometimes a similar 
problem arose when a contact seemed to be contacted and a link was drawn 
from the recruiter to the contact, but only the link and not the node were drawn.  
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Since TouchGraph is still developing into a mature product, the authors are 
confidant these issues will be resolved in future versions of the software. 
5. Emergent Behavior 
After running the simulation for several hundred turns, the emergent 
network clearly forms a scale-free, hub-and-spoke looking network.  Figure 24 
below shows the network after one run of 350 turns.  The run that created this 
network started with one leader, one trainer, and one recruiter. 
 
 
Figure 24.   Emergent Network Behavior. 
 
Figure 24 clearly shows the leaders (in red) as the most connected agents 
in the simulation, followed by some of the trainers (in yellow) and recruiters (in 
blue).  The leaders have formed their own cells, creating a hub and spoke look to 
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the agents attached to the leaders.  Figure 25 below shows the first leader in the 
system, TA0, and all the agents within one degree of separation from that leader. 
 
 
Figure 25.   Leader’s Circle of Followers. 
 
The leader definitely has a small band of followers and the leader is 
connected to a logistician and two financiers, but no arms dealer.  The leader is 
also connected to the original trainer, TA1.  The other leaders in the network 
have very similar looking networks.  To show how well connected the original 
trainer is, see Figure 26 below. 
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Figure 26.   Original Trainer’s Closest Associates. 
 
The original trainer knows six out of seven of the leaders that emerged in 
this network, showing that the rich do get richer as the trainer continues to pass 
on operators to the leaders as the trainer of choice.  Interestingly, the higher the 
operator to leader ratio, the more connected the original trainer becomes as those 
extra operators not in a mission stay attached to that trainer.  As more leaders 
enter the system, the operators move on to cells, eventually losing contact with 
the trainer and the trainer begins to look less like the most connected agent in the 
system, but still a hub nonetheless.  The world of the original recruiter is not as 
well populated as seen in Figure 27 below. 
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Figure 27.   Original Recruiter’s Closest Associates. 
 
The recruiter is a minor hub, one connected to two trainers (including the 
original) and two leaders.  Since recruiters are removed from the process of 
providing operators to leaders by one extra step as compared to the trainers, they 
are less well connected within the organization.  The recruiters remain locally 
influential, gathering recruits, but not real involved in the rest of the organization 
as was the expected behavior.  Lastly, the specialists’ inner circle remains the 
leaders they interact with to provide resources as evidenced by the financier’s 
network in Figure 28 below. 
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Figure 28.   Financier’s Inner Circle. 
 
The financier knows six out of seven leaders in the system and no one 
else, as is the expected behavior since they only move in the highest circles once 
they become influential.  As a whole the system produces reasonable and 
plausible scale-free networks based on the low level interactions of the agents, 
which were defined based on their expected associations and activities with each 
other. 
6. Future Work and Optimizations 
The authors had several other elements they wished to implement in the 
TNS, but were left for future work.  Most importantly, the authors’ had intended 
to implement the four Stimulus Based Discovery tactics with a Blue agent that 
“learned” about the terrorist network from intercepted communications and 
observed connectors.  Blue’s probability to detect a communication or connector 
would be based on many factors including the terrorist agents experience, 
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familiarity with the recipient and network penetration.  For example, a very 
experienced financier simulates a wealthy individual sympathetic to the terror 
cause or an organizer that operates among sympathetic elites.  Whereas a low-
experience financier simulates operators that conduct credit card fraud and 
armed robbery to gather resources.  In this example, Blue’s probability to detect 
credit card fraud and armed robbery is significantly higher than an experienced 
financier that provides resources only through established trust relationships. 
Blue’s variable probability of detection would needs to be implemented across all 
interactions.  This probability scheme would form the basis for Blue’s capability 
to construct his own mental map of the terrorist network.  From this map, Blue 
would also need a decision system to create different stimuli and to target 
and/or engage hubs when discovered.  With these components in place the 
authors intended to conduct a series of experiments that collected quantitative 
data such as a network suppression score measured by the number of mission 
points that were successfully executed, and other network health metrics 
referenced in social networking literature.  Furthermore, the authors felt that 
qualitative data would be available on the emergent behavior of the network 
when subjected to attack. 
Additionally, the authors had intended to configure the simulation from 
XML files so that the dozens of parameters controlling agent interaction could be 
changed without re-compiling the simulation’s source code.  This step is critical 
to running a large sample of different networks that validate the scale-free 
topology under a wide array of input variables.  Another feature the authors had 
on their list was the ability to “grow” an organization for a period of time and 
then store the state variables of the organization with a capability to recall them 
later.  This allows experimentation on “mature” networks.  For example, these 
mature networks would then be used in several experiments with different 
targeting strategies to show how the same network responded to different forms 
of stimulus and attack. 
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Directed messaging, already mentioned above, would cut down on the 
number of messages being created and processed in the system and therefore 
improve the performance of the system.   
Another optimization that would improves performance deals the 
authors’ adaptation of RELATE in RelationshipManager.  When an agent 
was checking to see if another agent should be added to an existing relationship 
and that proposed agent was not maximally connected in any the first agent’s 
relationships, a new one was created.  As an optimization, instead of just simply 
creating a new relationship, the algorithm could check the proposed agent’s 
relationships to see if the first agent was maximally connected in the second 
agent’s relationships, thus possibly cutting down on the number of 
Relationship objects created.  Additionally, the TNS does not have any code 
to eliminate duplicate relationships.  The authors found this problem occurred 
when a third member of a three-way relationship left the relationship that the 
remaining two stayed in the relationship.  When the remaining two were 
involved in several three-way relationships where the third member was 
different in each one, but the other two remained the same, the remaining two 
would end up with several Relationship objects with the same membership, 
thus wasting memory.   
Lastly, the TNS was designed so that agents could have multiple roles, 
each having multiple goals.  As such, the code used Java Iterators and 
Enumerations extensively for iterating through the various Vectors.  In these 
iterations, new objects were created and subsequently destroyed during each 
loop, creating additional work and overhead for the object creation and 
destruction.  To optimize these iterations, one object reference should be created 
outside of the loop and then it should be assigned the reference for each object in 
the Vector, thus saving processing time and memory. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Two structural characteristics of conflict in the Information Age are 
apparent now in the pioneering days of this new era.  First, the Information Age 
empowers individuals to act alone or in small groups with great strategic impact.  
This elevates the unpredictable nature of a deranged individual or secret sect to 
strategic significance and brings with it high uncertainty about who opponents 
will be and where they will strike.  As such, it becomes futile to create exhaustive 
plans to account for all avenues of attack.  The second characteristic obvious now 
is that the U.S. military has broken the historic link tying range with accuracy.  
American Sailors, Marines, Soldiers an Airmen must no longer get close to get 
accurate.  The challenge for attacking networks of empowered individuals 
devolves to finding valid targets for the application of that firepower that leads 
to network suppression.   
The first step in finding such targets requires a revised strategic 
framework for evaluating networked adversaries.  However, the Joint 
Professional Military Education given to most military officers has become 
formulaic and is not well suited to adversaries that defy categorization in 
industrial terms.  Additionally, the Joint Campaign Planning Process is not 
aligned to fight adversaries that cannot be mapped before hostilities commence.  
This is a disturbing shortfall in the capability to fight networks that demands a 
new concept for a new kind of fight.  This new concept should allow for broad 
application of principles, but provide clear discriminates of who and what to 
engage. 
Unfortunately, most attempts to locate and discriminate network threats 
are reliant on passive systems to “put the pieces together” and “see where it 
leads.”  Such defensive tools are evidenced by ongoing efforts to increase 
surveillance, build large databases and information management systems, and 
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the organizational redesign of numerous law enforcement agencies.  These tools 
and new bureaucracies are worthwhile, but lack key components of a military 
strategy to defeat network threats.  Because the aforementioned steps rely 
heavily on unintended mistakes by an adversary in order to gain detection they 
are inherently defensive.  If an adversary is cunning and avoids detection there 
are few tools in place that force mistakes.  Consider how easily major league 
baseball players would hit homeruns if they did not have to hit against pitchers 
that force mistakes.  Therefore, while defensive measures are critically important 
to securing America from emergent threats they do not form a complete solution 
set.  
Fortunately, discoveries in new areas of science provide tools that allow 
for military attack against elusive networks.  Albert-László Barabási and a group 
of researchers at the University of Notre Dame have recently brought to light the 
mathematics and science on one of nature’s most naturally occurring 
phenomena: networks.  The importance of this discovery is amplified by the fact 
that natural human social activity forms networks, independent of any other 
organizational structures that those individuals may by a part of, and that those 
networks are scale-free.  Since those networks are scale-free, they benefit from a 
natural robustness against random failures and attacks, yet at the same time, 
those same networks suffer from one highly crippling Achilles heel.  The most 
connected nodes in a scale free system, called hubs, are susceptible to attacks 
which will break the network apart, and eviscerate its structural connectivity.  If 
the hubs in a scale-free network can be found and a significant portion of them 
negatively affected in near simultaneity, then network functionality will halt, 
effectively shattering its operation. 
The issue then for military intelligence and targeting is to find those hubs.  
To take the offensive against networks the authors have proposed a strategy to 
find hubs in concealed networks.  This strategy called “Stimulus Based 
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Discovery” aims to accelerate learning against a denied system, thus leading to 
targeting information faster than standoff observation. 
The case studies in Stimulus Based Discovery demonstrate the four tactics 
for stimulating networks to reveal their topology.  The tactics presented are 
explicit nodal stimulus, explicit link stimulus, cognitive nodal distortion, and 
cognitive link distortion.  In each case, stimulating the adversary network 
accelerated the revelation of network components that would have otherwise 
remained hidden, been learned with much less fidelity, or taken much longer to 
discover.  Exploiting the naturally occurring social network between human 
nodes attained the success achieved in each case.  The theory and case studies in 
Stimulus Based Discovery suggest three findings about attacking networks. 
• All complex human systems form scale-free networks. 
• Scale-free networks are quite robust against failure and random 
attack but crumble when network hubs are successfully debilitated. 
• Stimulus Based Discovery leads quickly to hub identification and 
network mapping thereby accelerating network collapse. 
Since social networks were at the center of stimulus efforts, then a model 
of social human behavior in a networked organization could be built as a 
laboratory for applying the authors’ proposed targeting strategy.  Using a 
natural parallel for complex human interaction, a Multi-Agent System (MAS), the 
authors created a model of human interaction within a hypothetical terrorist 
organization.  The design focused on interactions and collaboration between 
terrorists, represented as software agents, and framed by the relationships that 
terrorist archetypes could plausibly have with each other.  Each agent takes on 
one or more of these archetypes, or roles, in the organization, and each role 
brings with it associated goals that drive the agents’ actions. 
The MAS, dubbed the Terrorist Network Simulation (TNS), was founded 
on the design principles of Jacques Ferber and extended agent concepts forged at 
the Naval Postgraduate School’s MOVES Institute by John Hiles.  
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Implementations of Hiles’ ideas such as Brian Osborn’s Story Engine and Kim 
Roddy and Mike Dickson’s RELATE architecture provided a solid foundation for 
TNS.  The authors’ work modified the RELATE architecture to create a model of 
terrorist agents existing in the iterative and evolving story of recruiting, training, 
planning, preparing, and carrying out terrorist missions against targets of their 
design.  The simulation design incorporates two models of communication, the 
first of which, connectors, is based on Hiles’ cellular protein metaphor, for 
entities to connect with each other and take certain actions upon making contact.  
The other communication model is a broadcast e-mail-like system that allows 
agents to reach other agents across the network.  TNS also uses the concept of 
tickets and frames extensively to give the agents procedural knowledge that they 
use in accomplishing their goals. 
Most importantly, TNS validates the formation of scale-free networks as a 
conceptual tool for attacking terror networks.  There is no high-level control 
structure to govern the connections in TNS.  However, by implementing growth 
and preferential attachment in low level interactions the macro behavior of scale-
free systems is self-organizing.  The authors’ simulation clearly shows the 
formation of a scale-free network topology, developed over time without any 
global control.  Given the fact that the simulation creates a scale-free terrorist 
network based on human nature, the authors conclude that the model can and 
should be used for future experiments to refine the four theoretical tactics for 
Stimulus Based Discovery.  Furthermore, the authors’ adaptations of RELATE, 
the message communication system, and the authors’ implementation of 
connectors, frames, and tickets provide an outstanding structure for building a 
wide variety of other network simulations. 
Lastly, the authors left some areas for future work.  Most importantly, the 
authors did not implement the four stimulus tactics in the TNS model.  This 
work is important to refine Stimulus Based Discovery and to provide both 
132 
quantitative and qualitative analysis on network behavior under attack.  
Additionally, the model should be configured to import a runtime configuration 
that does not require recompiling the source code.  This would allow a large 
sample of different networks that validate the scale-free topology under a wide 
array of input variables.  Also, the ability to “grow” an organization for a period 
of time and then store the state variables allows experimentation on “mature” 
networks.  For example, these mature networks would then be used in several 
experiments with different targeting strategies to show how the same network 
responded to different forms of stimulus and attack. 
In conclusion, Stimulus Based Discovery converts American firepower 
superiority into information advantage over networks.  Despite the overuse of 
the word network in discussion of “Network-Centric”, “FORCEnet”, “Netwar”, 
“Navy Marine Corps Intranet”, and dozens of other permutations it is the 
authors’ observation that most of the network concepts discussed in the armed 
forces tend to focus on how our military can benefit from the power of 
information and networking.  Rather than join this important debate, Stimulus 
Based Discovery begins a new thread examining how networks already exist in 
our current and future adversaries, and adversary networks already contain 
inherent vulnerabilities that can be exploited to achieve network collapse.  
Observant readers may have already considered the extension of this inherent 
vulnerability that American networks and our current fascination with building 
more networks unduly expose U.S. forces to Stimulus Based Discovery and hub 
attack.  Therefore, a final potential for future work is an analysis of American 
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